Tuesday, May 8, 2007

Reciprocation and social contractarianism as the basis of rights

The single most compelling argument against animal rights, IMHO, is that the construction of rights is based upon the ability to reciprocate and social contractarianism. It is an argument that I do not feel that ARAs, even the most well-spoken academics among them, have a sufficient answer for. In response to another earlier post, a reader, Carol, left some outstanding comments that do an excellent job of explaining this concept. That entire thread can be read here, but I have also re-posted Carol's comments, unedited, in today's post because I feel an understanding of this is so vital to the AR debate, and also in hopes of perhaps facilitating a discussion of it. These comments are quite lengthy, but are an important and worthwhile read if one wants to truly get a grasp of this concept. A big "thank you!" to Carol for taking the time to leave such well thought out and insightful commentary.



Hi Grizzly and Gary – Sorry I’m late coming into the conversation on reciprocity and rights. I’ve been exceedingly busy with work, veggie gardening, and whatnot.

Yes, Grizzly, I am a vegetarian and a former animal rights advocate.

I have much to say on the reciprocation as the basis of rights. Please feel free to edit if this is too long a post.

Gary, you wrote: “Not only do I consider the "animals don't deserve rights unless they can reciprocate them" argument to be shamefully weak and immoral on its face, but it has been thoroughly rebuked in a hundred animal rights sites and philosophy texts that have nothing to do with animal rights.”

How can the reciprocity argument as the basis for having rights be weak? After all, look what happens/should happen to anyone with rights – an adult human, a juvenile, and a so-called “marginal human,” even inanimate entities/artificial legal persons (trusts, corporations – that does not reciprocate rights, as in when they commit a crime/violating the basic legal rights of another. They lose some or all of their rights. Reciprocity is necessary, then, because those who refuse to reciprocate (criminals) we agree that they should forfeit some or all of their rights. For those who cannot reciprocate (“marginal human cases”) we agree can only have limited rights based on their limited capacity to reciprocate or have rights in custody that are “released” as they develop the ability to reciprocate rights (rights that they also shall lose, or they shall be disciplined in other ways, if they fail to reciprocate), or they do not have rights at all, but are instead given special legal protections (e.g., infants and very young children), until they can take on adult responsibilities and rights, or they never have rights (e.g., anencephalic infants).

Probably not my place to make a fair judgement on this, but rights theorists and philosophers who refute the reciprocity requirement argument made as a basis for having and maintaining rights as well as to deny basic legal rights to animals and humans (like babies and children, e.g.) are actually quite few. Far more animal rights texts seem to refute the reciprocity requirement argument. Both, in my opinion, have a hard time invalidating it. I think both animal rights and human rights philosophy texts do acknowledge that rights are essentially contractual, thus, reciprocal, relationships. That is, we observe rights as assurances or guarantees of behaviour that enable human individuals and groups to live, develop and flourish in conditions necessary to maintain social equilibrium. Social/legal rights are defined by corresponding direct duties, positive and negative so as to fulfill the other’s right. You, for example have a right to life, which means that I have a duty not to murder you or violate that right to life without just cause, and vice versa. We have the same right to life and we are reciprocally bound to honour each other’s right to life. We can opt out of this reciprocal agreement, and then we may lose our rights or have them seriously curtailed. By devising and wanting the benefits of rights protections and appealing to rights when we feel we have been wronged, we have indeed contracted with each other to participate in and respect each other’s basic rights.

One objection made by animal rights of the reciprocity requirement for having rights argument is that rights in this way are seen to be grounded in the notion of contractarianism or the social contract theory or ethics. In my opinion, contractarianism has, however, had a worse rap than I think it deserves. Philosophy writings, both human rights and “AR”, has sometimes interpreted quite differently what the nature of reciprocity in contractarianism is and what the social contract view is. From what I have read, commentary has varied from just different interpretations made to an outright misunderstanding of the reciprocity argument in the contract theory of ethics and rights.

There is just as much modern philosophical writings supporting the rationale of contractarianism by re-explaining the background and elements of the social contract tradition, and the reciprocity argument and rights grounded within. Some philosophers remark that the contractarianism/reciprocity argument does have a number of attractive features to explain the fundamental questions of what morality demands of us and why we should be obliged to obey those demands, as well as its application to rights and other social realities. While the contract view of morality/ethics and rights may have flaws, and arguments against it may be quite compelling, these criticisms are no more impressive than the objections that have been directed at other, more popular views. There is certainly not consensus about the theory of rights and I think with most ethical theories one can find both legitimate problems and also veracity to them.

A few sources concerning such include:

A short chapter on The social contract tradition by Will Kymlica in Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, A Companion to Ethics, Edited by Peter Singer;

Chapter 11, The Idea of a Social Contract in The Elements of Moral Philosophy, by James Rachels;

From the Against Politics web, The Contractarian Theory of Morals:
FAQ http://www.againstpolitics.com/contractarianism_faq/index.html

Theories of Rights, edited by Jeremy Waldron, Oxford Reading in Philosophy.

As to the reciprocity requirement argument being a guide for our moral behavior towards each other and animals, “AR” has argued that animals should have rights to life and have rights claims against us not to be made to suffer “needlessly”, e.g., as a matter of moral conscience. Moreover, reciprocity does not explain our moral behavior and how we regard the moral wrongness of killing another person without just cause, or stealing from your neighbour, etc. It is not that I do not do nasty things to you on the condition that you don’t do nasty things to me. It is that doing nasty things to people is just plain wrong and causes unjust moral injury. I think this is fine and works only so far. Though people can know by moral intuition and by reason that certain behavior is immoral, we need to be motivated by something else to ensure that people behave accordingly and consistent to their moral reasoning and/or moral intuition. For me, moral conscience and moral sensitivity is not enough. People cannot simply be trusted to act on their moral conscience to do good or to punish themselves/others for doing wrong and will others to do the same. Something else must motivate us to behaviorally uphold our moral conscience. One may know it is wrong to take four apples and only pay for three, but if there is no mechanism by which to first negotiate with others the benefits of good behaviour and then enforce that behavior with a threat of punishment or appropriate penalty for misbehaving, and so, if we know there shall be no serious consequence, we shall try to get away with it. Also, a consequence of punishment/loss or curtailment of benefits that come from playing by the rules shows that a behavior is seriously wrong and unjust, whereas no consequence like punishment endorses that the behaviour is not really immoral. In other words, it is not only that we are unjustly hurting the other when we do bad things, but also that we need to be able to reasonably hope and demand that the other will show us the same respect that we show them. Actually, rights to be had and maintained aren’t really dependent on moral conscientiousness of those who shall possess and uphold rights. Hence, the most wicked and odious human beings can maintain rights, and hence we have duties to them even though we may reasonably loathe them. So, for example, it matters not to me that you respect my rights because of some moral concept of “inherent value” you feel I have, or that it is out of compassion or empathy for my suffering. It also matters not if you have no moral regard for me. What matters is that you can reciprocate and so don’t unfairly hurt me, but also that if you do violate me I can appeal some way to have your behavior judged as wrong, have my injury be taken into meaningful account by receiving appropriate reparations and having you appropriately punished.

Though moral conscience and moral concepts, such as inherent value, compassion, and empathy for another’s suffering that validates the wrongness of doing moral damage to another, are important, we are motivated to come to respect rights and hold people accountable also through an enforced social agreement – i.e., reciprocity: I don’t unjustly kill you, so I have the right to life and other freedom rights, and the benefits of have such rights include knowing that you won’t unjustly murder me. You don’t unfairly kill me, so you keep your rights and other basic rights, and the benefits of having those rights guarantees that I won’t unfairly kill you. Should one of us unduly kill or attempt to kill the other, one is in breach of the compact – a mutual, reciprocal agreement - and we lose some or all of our rights, depending on how the courts deem the heinousness of the crime, the victim’s injury is taken into moral and legal account and duly compensated, and the transgressor appropriately punished in the event that s/he may be “purged” of the wrong they committed and resume – if ever again - their place in the moral community of rights. That is what we philosophically have agreed upon in terms of rights.

Similarly with moral rights versus legal rights. Much of “rights” talk in “AR” is in the vein of “intrinsic”, “inherent”, “natural”, or “moral” rights. If I understand properly the meaning of natural or moral rights and leaving aside the arguments as to whether human and nonhuman animals have such rights, the problem I have with philosophical talk of moral rights is that there is no objective mechanism by which to demand basic moral and nature-given rights to be acknowledged and respected in practice. There is nothing like a mutually agreed upon contract which is then enshrined in some apparatus (law, e.g.) to properly enforce it. That is, there is no mechanism for reciprocity or social contract, which is the means by which such rights can be demanded and maintained. Moral rights even if they “naturally” exist or ought morally to be had can only be honoured from an internal sense of sympathetic moral duty or good conscience, and if violated there is no recourse to hold the transgressor responsible and to secure reparation for the violated through formal and objective means, like the legal system.

On the animalrights.net discussion forum someone posted to the effect that people, over time and in general, attracted by advantages arising from associations and the conditions necessary to maintain social equilibrium, have negotiated exchanges of their so-called natural rights for social ones. Unlike natural rights which are defined by our nature and sheer physical capabilities, social rights are defined by duties, positive and negative. I acknowledge that certain basic legal rights are also seen as moral rights (the right to life, e.g.) and moral rights can be justification for having them enforced or turned into legal rights. My point is, though, legal rights, unlike moral/intrinsic/natural rights, are enforceable by legal procedures, and function as a mutual exchange so that if one respects in return the rights of another one has full rights, and if such rights are violated there is a system in place to have the injury taken into moral and legal account, punish the wrongdoer, and compensate the wronged.

The key to any substantive basic rights theory is the ability to reciprocate (on a societal level, not just reciprocate on a personal and instinctual level) rights. Because that is the way rights work and must work to sustain them and make them effective for those who shall have them. (Another key element to basic rights is that they are trumps; rights cannot – except under the most exceptional circumstances, and which must be justified - be overridden by the interests of another or others for perceived consequence, even if that consequence is death). It would not be a stable society where individuals permitted to fail to recognize the right not to be killed by another rights-holding being. Rights being essentially contracts means they are mutually binding, and so can only be had by people who can and will reciprocate. Because, without that capacity to reciprocate it would destroy the whole concept of rights altogether. If we say we have rights but then we didn’t respect each others’ rights and never punish those who violate rights because these “violators” are moral patients, unable to understand what it means to reciprocate on a societal level, then having rights would be meaningless.

Rights and responsibilities are a two-way street. That is, rights function on a mutual exchange basis. Not on an I, being a full reciprocating moral agent, must respect your rights; but, you can infringe my rights without serious consequence because you don’t have the capacity to respect my rights in return. Among humans, whether they can understand right from wrong or whether they have the capacity to reciprocate or chose not to reciprocate rights, they lose the benefits afforded with having rights if they infringe upon other people’s rights. Rights are moral equalizers, meaning rights-holders stand in equal moral and legal relation to each other. That is, if I’m expected to respect an other’s rights, then that other I expect to honour my rights as well, and we are both treated equally under the law should either one of us violate the other’s rights. As such, both parties must somehow be able to respect the other’s rights, because having rights demands that the violator of rights be held morally and legally accountable, that the injury done be morally and legally counted, and that the victim be duly compensated, and that the transgressor be appropriately punished. If any elements were to be dismantled, it would weaken the notion and value of rights. Not many of us, justifiably, would be motivated by such one-sided reciprocation of rights and clear erosion of the true meaning and import of rights. “AR” seeks to apply to certain animals the same basic rights (I’m not referring to conditional rights, like the right to vote and the right to a college education) that humans have maintained. But, “AR” wants rights to be a one-way street only, conferring rights in animals but eliminating the reciprocal element in rights for them.

Recognizing animals’ rights imposes a moral obligation not only on us as humans to protect and recognize the rights of animals, but also imposes the same obligation on animals towards other rights-holding animals and towards rights-holding humans as well. Rights conferring moral and legal equality and being a two-way street means that if it’s wrong for me to kill a rights-holding nonhuman animal, it is also wrong for a rights-holding animal to kill me, and both must be held equally morally and legally accountable. Thus, animals, too, must be able to respect the same basic rights of their conspecifics and of other nonhuman animal species, as well as the similar or same basic legal rights of humans. If failure to reciprocate is sufficient cause to deny basic rights to humans, then animals, who shall be in the same moral category of rights-holding entities, and by virtue of having rights should be no different. That is how it is with all human beings and their basic rights, whether we can understand right from wrong or not, reciprocate or not. That the fundamental nature of rights are that of being trump cards that cannot be overridden and that of being a two-way street, or contract, is very, very important, in my opinion, and should not be trivialized.


Animal rights writings suggest that human guardians should ensure that the rights of humans and other animals are respected by animals, the way they are able to ensure human children and mental incompetents do not violate rights and other legally protected interests. Further, if the animal’s rights-protected interest is violated, the human guardian can invoke the animal’s rights and a legal suit on behalf of the animal can be brought in the animal’s own name, making the defendant legally and morally obligated to make reparations for the damages directly to the animal, rather than the human acting on behalf of the animal or animal’s owner. There would be damages to the animal, independent of any damages natural persons may suffer on account of what is done to the animal that affected negatively its welfare and violated its rights. I’m not sure how humans shall ensure animals to not violate the rights of other animals – if rights shall be truly “rights” - and how we shall make claims for the victims of rights violation. Considering animal conduct is amoral, meaning that the victim cannot be said to have their rights violated by another animal. This is wholly different in human-to-human cases, including marginal humans, whom “AR” say are morally the same as animals, thus, justifying animals having rights. Yet, we in practice would treat these “morally same beings” (according to “AR”) differently. That is not ethical, in my opinion.


Of course, “AR” advocates mean abuse and rights violations caused by humans against animals, not rights violations caused by nonhuman animals against other animals and humans. Again, in order to maintain their true meaning and sacred value, their power and efficiency, rights should not be separated from their correlative duties. Rights and responsibilities function as a two-way street, and it is essential that they function as such lest we render them weak and essentially meaningless. Rights impose upon the one who shall have that right a direct duty. Not a guardian. Finally, that rights reciprocating human moral agents can ensure their conspecific children do not violate the rights of others, and that human moral agents can by proxy make claims for children when their rights or legal protections are damaged does not logically mean that humans are morally-bound to do the same for nonhuman animals. For one thing the “marginality” of “marginal” human beings and animals is profoundly different and so are their situations in relation to themselves, to other animals, and to humans. We count on the agency or ability to reciprocate. We don’t depend on a rights-holder’s guardian, and what if the guardian cannot always be there at every interaction with every being the moral patient right-holder comes into contact with? Also, there would be far more nonhuman animals who shall have rights, yet we expect to place the entire onus of rights being respected by animals onto fewer human moral agents, as well as appoint even fewer humans as guardian ad litem to prosecute or defend a suit on behalf of animals incapacitated by their inability to reciprocate rights and make claims against others who violate their rights.


But also, some “AR” say, by us recognizing rights of the weak (animals) with correlative duties only for the strong (humans) but without correlative duties for the weak, such an arrangement shall help make the world a fairer place (per Morals, Reason, and Animals, by SF Sapontzis). But, in my opinion, this would be unjust because it would diminish the moral importance of basic rights. Again, rights confer a duty in every rights-holder – not a guardian - to respect and uphold others’ rights. The notion of rights fails if the only rights-holding individuals being asked to observe rights are those who can and do reciprocate, because such means that their rights can be violated and denied by special groups of individuals who are without duties to reciprocate. Therefore, for rights to exist or to be maintained at all, rights require reciprocity. Without reciprocity there can be no rights structure, or a very diluted and ineffectual rights structure. Reciprocity or societal expectations that rights will be respected is required in order to maintain rights at all. If individuals cannot reciprocate, the notion of basic legal rights becomes meaningless. Rights involve a special relationship between beings, a moral binding. Again, we count on the other’s agency or ability to reciprocate. We don’t depend on a rights-holder’s guardian. The ability to reciprocate on a societal level is what makes rights work. Rights depend on recognizing and upholding the rights of other rights-holding entities. My right not to be killed without just cause by you is a right if there is legal entitlement, but also if there is a correlative obligation imposed on you to fulfill that entitlement and refrain from denying me it. In this way, rights are reciprocal. Rights without responsibility or binding duties between rights-holders are valueless. Rights being moral equalizers have to be practiced reciprocally by all rights-holders – who are morally and legally in same relationship, thus, also bound to reciprocate – in order for rights to exist and be maintained at all.


Moreover, it is not a fairer place when one rights-holding group (animals) gets off scot-free for infringing rights where the other group (humans, including marginal humans) does not. Marginal humans lose their rights if they don’t reciprocate rights.


If marginal humans are so morally similar to animal beings, why should animals retain their rights when we deny marginal humans rights for infringing the rights of others? In the world of human-human rights if you don’t reciprocate rights, whether you are a moral agent or a marginal human case, you are punished by having to forfeit your rights. Whereas in the world of animal-human rights, humans, including marginal humans, would still be denied rights if they violate animal rights just as if they violate the same human rights, while animals are excused and deemed unable to violate rights. That is not fairness or justice. If animals shall be accorded rights as a matter of justice, because they are morally similar to marginal humans according to “AR” and since rights bring rights-bearers into equal moral relationship, then animals breaching human and other animal rights would be an injustice.

For “AR”, the reciprocity requirement implies that only the strong or a dominating species or group can gain rights. This notion may be a throwback from more ancient contractual rights that were often, it has been written, did not involve reciprocal supportiveness. For example, the belief that a father was owed as a matter of right the respect of his children did not necessarily denote a duty upon the father to return that respect. Today’s contractual rights, however, are mutual and equal. Still, some argue that even in modern day, rights are still one-sided because the rights of children remain in dispute. I will get to children rights in a bit. In the meantime, I argue that rights are not based on power. Rather, rights are based on reciprocity. There are many weak, powerless, poor, sickly people who have the same rights as the strong, powerful, rich, and robust. Rights are moral equalizers and rights cannot be overridden for narrowly utilitarian reasons or some perceived net good. One could argue that it is more likely that when rights are a one-way street, we cannot trust others not to respect rights or basic interests whenever they judge that some net good or personal good might result, and when there is no effective system to punish those who do override basic rights of others, then social relationships would become more difficult and the lives of all but the most powerful would be impoverished. But, when rights function as they should, as social contracts based on two-way, mutual reciprocity, then rights do inhibit the strong and strengthen the weak. To be a rights holder is to have the same basic rights and to recognize and accept the duties conferred, along with the threat of punishment for violating them. Rights, thus, protect the weak against the strong, allowing the weak to have a fair chance of fulfilling those basic interests of theirs that are now protected by rights. The weak have the same basic legal right to life, e.g., as the strong, they have the same duties towards one another in terms of respecting each others’ rights, and both shall lose some or all of their rights the same way should they infringe upon the others’ rights.

Rights are had not because of physical, economic or political power, species membership, huge intelligence, and the like, but because people have been able to construct rights of a very specifically important nature and function and have agreed to have them and are willing to act accordingly. That is, because one can reciprocate. One can chose to eschew this social agreement at any time and free oneself of the obligation to reciprocate, and in so doing one loses rights. But, if rights were not respected and could be violated as a matter of course without recourse to establish moral and legal damage, punishment for the wrongdoer and recompense for the wronged, then rights and their purpose are rendered meaningless.

The appeal for “AR” saying the reciprocity requirement implies the strong have rights is that rights should be derived from the idea of fairness, and so it would only be fair that the reciprocity requirement not apply fully to animals, whereby rights to life for animals would be only with correlative duties for the strong, but not for the weaker nonhuman animals. It’s not fair, in my opinion, that rights be a one-way street, where one party can hold onto rights without having to reciprocate respect for others’ rights, even holding on to rights having infringed upon another’s same rights, because it diminishes the importance of the moral and legal dynamics of rights.

Animal rights and other philosophical writings argue that the reciprocity requirement argument is like a club one can join only if one is capable of knowing the rules and can or wants to abide by those rules. This would have to leave out humans, like babies and young children, as well as the severely mentally disabled, and, of course animals, who obviously cannot contract at this level. Just because not all humans can reciprocate does not mean that they are left without protection. One makes the distinction between being protected as a basic part of the social agreement, and being protected by rights by virtue of having the capacity to reciprocate and thus having the ability to create and participate in the rights contract. E.g., humans have the right to protect their property. Protection of our property includes protection of animals whose legal status is one of property. Pets don’t have rights, but they have protections in so far as having such protects our property rights. Similarly with regard to children. Adults have the right not to be caused moral injury without just cause, a requirement that extends to refraining from injuring those who are in the care of rights-bearing adults. Your injuring my child will be a case of your injuring me. Children may not have the legal autonomous right to not be caused injury because they can’t reciprocate rights the way adults can, but they do have protections not to be caused that which imposes a duty on those who can reciprocate to not cause them unjust injury.



Another line of argument being that denying rights because an entity is unable to reciprocate is to fail to properly acknowledge the distinction between the capacity to respect and reciprocate rights of others (full moral agency) and the capacity to benefit from rights (moral patienthood or moral beneficence). The point being that, individuals who are moral agents (able to reciprocate at a societal level and so able to reciprocate rights) can recognize that they have the capacity by their choices of action to effect positively or negatively the well-being of others (so-called “nonmoral agents” who cannot permanently or temporarily reciprocate rights). As such, moral agents are, therefore, morally obliged to take into moral and legal regard the effects of their behavior on the well-being of those vulnerable others who are affected by choices of actions of moral agents. On this view, it is morally irrelevant, then, that nonmoral beings don’t have the capacity to reciprocate. What is morally relevant is that nonmoral beings, both animals and humans (though, in my opinion, humans are not “nonmoral”, except for anencephalic infants), have a well-being that can be positively or negatively affected, making them morally considerable for having rights.



Indeed, it is argued in both human rights philosophical writings and “AR”, even within the class of humans (full moral agents and “moral patients” or “marginal humans”) the characteristics for being a bearer of rights are not necessarily the same as the characteristics for having an obligation to honour those basic rights in others. This being so, it is alleged, has not disqualified all humans from having rights. Or it should not disqualify them, for there is dispute about children rights, for example. At any given time there are going to be humans who are going to have more rights than responsibilities (the adult mentally handicapped, the senile, e.g.) , or rights without responsibilities (e.g., babies and children). This subgroup of human beings are not able to recognize rights and reciprocate rights, and yet are capable of having their well-being affected negatively or positively by the choices of other peoples’ actions toward them. That is, these special human cases (or “marginal human cases” as per Jan Narveson who gave the argument from marginal human cases from its name – source: Babies and Basts: The Argument from Marginal Cases by Daniel A. Dombrowski, p. 51) are capable to having and benefiting from rights. We all, it is alleged, tacitly recognize, or ought morally to recognize, the non-equitability of rights with responsibilities. True, rights and responsibilities are related in that responsible humans will forfeit some or all their rights by violating the rights of others. But, it is argued, this relationship of rights and duties is a conditional linkage on whether one is a moral agent who can have responsibilities. Rights and responsibilities, it is argued, can be separate and does not depend on all having the capacity to reciprocate. Responsibility is the price for those who have that particular capacity – the capacity to reciprocate rights. It’s not the price for everyone, however. Most of the time rights and responsibilities happen to go hand in hand, because most humans are or will mature into full moral agents with an awareness of right and wrong, an appreciation of probable and possible outcomes of actions, and a choice and the knowledge that there is a choice for a better or worse course of action. And because most humans do possess or will possess contractual capacities, i.e., the capacity to understand the nature of the arrangement within the contract, able to reach conscious agreement with a genuine concurrent intention to simultaneously carry out their binding duties or obligations in such a way as to confer the benefits outlined in the agreement on the other, so as to make the contract meaningful, and if one party should fail to act this way, then that person forfeits their position in the contract and forfeits the benefits of the contract. But, moral agency and the capacity to reciprocate at a societal level is not, in reality, universal among humans.



The capacity (of human and animal moral patients) to be positively and negatively affected by the actions of others, particularly moral agents, does not necessarily confer a right in one. There are plenty of goods and harms that are not even protected by rights, and rightly so. The fact that beings who are not full and mature moral agents can benefit from rights, alone, does not mean that such individuals ought or should be holders of rights. It only means that they could benefit from having rights. It is not enough to be able to benefit from rights. Anything can benefit from rights or rights claims against us to leave them alone or preserve them intact. Trees, mountains, bioregions, fossils, riparian systems, cabbage loopers, the list goes on. But rights, and the kind of society and community relationships that can maintain rights, is conditional upon those who shall bear rights to uphold rights, i.e., reciprocate. That’s why babies and children who are not fully rational agents because they are still developing, as well as the severely mentally vulnerable who have lost temporarily or permanently their ability to reciprocate on a societal level, don’t actually have rights. Instead, they have special legal protections, which are not the same as rights. Or, such special human cases have rights in custody or have limited rights based on their limited capacities of reciprocity and rationality. Whatever, a right has a corresponding binding obligation: In order for me to have a right, I must respect the right of others, otherwise I lose my right. That rule goes for special human cases as well. If such humans have rights at all, their strength are based on the capacity of the holder to reciprocate, and if the holder does not reciprocate they lose rights just as full moral agents do. A protection, on the other hand, has no such corresponding obligation on the one being protected, only on those who can have duties to and make decisions on behalf of another. The point is duties and responsibilities cannot be separated and that is why special human cases are treated differently, by rights in custody, limited rights, and/or legal protections.


So, the animal rights use of argument from marginal human cases does not hold and is no justification for giving animals rights. Because marginal human cases have legal protections instead of rights, or they have partial rights or rights held in custody that are released and lost upon the ability to reciprocate. Moreover, the “mariginality” and incapacity to reciprocate rights in marginal humans is very different from that of the marginality and permanent incapacity to socially reciprocate in animals. Marginal humans fall in the special category of “developing” or “sick” human beings. Human marginality is temporary or permanent and comes from mere accident in the middle of their lives, or their marginality comes at the end of their lives. Or, because these humans are immature, their marginality is a temporary stage in their human development. They shall be able to reciprocate rights, or they did but lost the capacity, or they did but lost the capacity and shall regain the capacity. Nonhuman animals never had nor shall they ever have the capacity to reciprocate rights.


A note on children rights. I am not that well versed on the legal status of children and other vulnerable, special human cases. There are different kinds of philosophical views and criticism on the subject of children as moral and/or legal rights holders, particularly as they lack the kind of autonomy and moral agency/reciprocity presumed by the idea of right, and therefore require supervision from adults. E.g., worries that children’s rights would undermine parental rights, separate children’s interests from those of their parents to whom children are dependent upon, and give more power to governments and court systems. But also that because children are powerless in virtue of their dependency on adults, rights serve as a moral, legal and political mechanism to ensure the needs of children are being met by their adult providers and protect them from bad families and other unjustified harms and serve the best interests of the child.


Advocates for children’s rights seem to refer to international treaties and agreements, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which I don’t think has been ratified by the US, and also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights mentions children being entitled to special care, protection and assistance. There is also the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution, which is said to apply to children, as well as family law in which children are supposed to have a number of legal “rights.”


But, not all humans have rights. Humans that do not have the lifetime potential to recognize and understand rights do not have rights. For example, infants born with anencephaly, a congenital absence of the brain and cranial vault, with the cerebral hemispheres missing or reduced to small masses. Most infants with anencephaly do not survive for more than a few days after birth. Such humans born without consciousness and without the potential for conscious choice have no rights; my understanding is that if the parents want, they can let their so-afflicted infants die by withholding nourishment and treatment. There is even debate about harvesting their organs. Parents may chose to protect their anencephalic infants, however. Whether, in this instance of parents wishing to protect such infants, the infants have rights is debatable. More likely, they have special legal protections granted and based on the rights and protections of their parents.


Developing children and the handicapped are said to have a variable set of rights based on their ability to understand the reciprocal nature of rights and the law and their own ability to reciprocate rights. Children are said to not have access to their full set of rights. Described as having the potential to uphold rights, children have limited rights or rights held in custody by a parent or legal guardian. This is why parents have jurisdiction over their children until they become independent and mature enough to take on adult responsibilities, at which time they have those rights “released” to them. Those who become mentally incapacitated may lose certain rights and those who are permanently mentally handicapped also have limited rights based on the limitations or loss of those faculties that have been damaged or destroyed by the disease or injury. Some say these rights for children and mentally handicapped are based on needs (calling them needs rights), which are a less restrictive conception of rights, linking rights to the protection of needs. Criticism of such includes that it leads to a proliferation of rights and dilutes the ethical and normative importance of basic autonomous human rights characterised by corresponding duties and the need for moral agency and reciprocity.


I am of the notion that although marginal humans (apart from infants with anencephaly) are in no way “amoral” and not “moral patients” in the way animals are, marginal humans who cannot properly understand and reciprocate rights, do not have the rights we give to responsible humans in the same society. Rather, they are provided legal protections – not rights - based on their needs. We misperceive them as rights, but they are not rights. We give human babies, for example, legal protections, but not rights. Their moral and legal status, which we mistake as “rights” comes from their belonging to a class (H. sapiens that typically and by nature reciprocates rights) that will eventually be able to reciprocate, and then have rights. Because children, mentally handicapped individuals, and other vulnerable groups of people cannot be truly rational agents and reciprocate rights, though it leaves them outside the purview of rights, they can still be protected (as already mentioned above) by strong protections which, as Kenan Malik says, “we use to ring-fence those incapable of bearing rights” (in letters between Peter Singer and Kenan Malik, “Should we breach the species barrier and grant rights to apes” http://www.kenanmalik.com/essays/singer_debate.html ). A right, Malik says “requires us to make our own decisions. A protection requires us to make decisions on behalf of another.” I would similarly say that a right has correlative duties, thus, requiring rights-holding parties to reciprocate, whereas a protection is with correlative duty only to the protector and no corresponding duty to the protected.


Actually, sometimes one might have to first discern what animal rightists and animal liberationist advocates mean by “rights.” Whether it is really rights they want for animals, and what kind of rights (moral or legal), or if they refer to the same kind of fundamental protection of life and freedom from certain treatment and harms that we afford to vulnerable humans, protections that have similar, and some argue same, moral and legal dynamics when they are claimed or had and when they are violated. Sometimes “AR” advocates and animal liberationists may refer to rights when they really mean protections. In letter conversation with Malik, Peter Singer states, “Rights have never been fundamental to my ethical scheme. I use the term as shorthand for the kind of protection that we give to all members of our species, not only to rational agents. All I want is that we protect apes in the same way that we protect vulnerable humans …” Malik also points out that, “The conflation of rights and protections is one of the ways in which rights for humans are being degraded.”


Either way, I don’t think it is argument enough for giving animals the same basic rights, or protections, that humans and marginal human cases have. Whether marginal humans are denied rights altogether because they can’t reciprocate ever and just have protections, with only duties imposed on the rest of us and none upon the marginal human. Or, that some marginal humans have only limited rights based on their limited capacity to reciprocate, and which they can still lose if they violate the rights of others. Or, that such humans have protections, until they can reciprocate at which time they get rights. Marginal humans having rights does not debunk the reciprocity argument for rights, because those rights can be and are denied if these human groups fail to reciprocate and violate rights of others. If marginal humans have protections instead of rights, that doesn’t discredit the reciprocity argument either, because they have legal protections instead precisely because they are said to be unable to reciprocate. Both shoot down the argument that because marginal humans have rights or protections, then animals should too, because they are – in terms of their incapacity to reciprocate – morally the same.


Other reasons why the “AR” use of argument from MHC is inadequate for justifying rights to animals is that humans have selfish/egoist reasons (which is also reason for our need for reciprocal agreements – social contracts) for including marginal humans in the purview of rights and/or legal protections, which are mainly based on reciprocity and the benefits therein. We include marginal cases because we all have been marginal cases (babies and children) and know that we may or will again become marginal cases ourselves (incapacitated by injury or biological accident in midlife or incapacitated by old age).


E.g., we were all babies and children once, and we must all grow from a stage of minimal cognitive consciousness to the mature and fully reciprocating agents we are now. So, we take an interest in having children grow up to becomes responsible members of society and respect other people’s rights and act within the law. They are our future and they are the ones who shall be the leaders in society and who shall be looking after us when we are incapacitated in mid life or in old age. Also, because children shall grow up to make rights claims autonomously, it would do well that we extend rights to them and make rights claims on their behalf until they reach that level of maturity to take on those responsibilities themselves. For children born permanently handicapped, they are entitled to care because that is what the parents want. We oblige because some of us could ourselves one day be parents or relatives of severely handicapped children, or some of us, too, are relatives or friends of such children and parents. We extend the same considerations to orphan children because some of us may have been orphans, or we might die unexpectedly and our own children may become orphans. Including all marginal human groups in the purview of rights or special legal protections is mutually beneficial, more so than not to include them.


We have moral obligations to adult marginal human beings also out of deference to the feelings and wants of their family and friends and other interested conspecifics. Adult marginal humans are the children, parents, other relatives, friends, etc. of others whom we have moral obligations to in relation to the value these interested parties upon these marginal beings. Some of us, too, are the children, relatives, friends and acquaintances of people with conditions rendering them as marginal humans, and we do care about them and we want them protected. It’s reciprocal. Being injured, sick, or having an age-related illness that incapacitate us physically and mentally or prevent us temporarily or permanently incapable of normal human functioning, are conditions that come in the mid or later stages of adult humans. So, we place such vulnerable adult human cases in the same moral category as normal human beings with at least partial basic rights and/or special legal protections because we know that any of us may become mentally debilitated as well by accident or with age. Reciprocity again. Moreover, many of these are people who are still interested in and capable of thinking about their own futures.


Maintaining rights, or special generalized protections, is important to protecting all of us from abuse should we fall into the same unfortunate or inevitable circumstances ourselves. Indeed, as human beings in a society where rights are fundamental we all have certain basic rights, equally and regardless of our intrinsic differences, including differences in the level reciprocity, which are only temporary or come at the end stage of human life or come in between as mere accident and unfortunate circumstance. We don’t justify unequal treatment to avoid mistreatment and what some suggest as Singer-esque justifications for infanticide and euthanasia campaigns (I don’t believe, however, that Dr. Peter Singer is at all trying to justify infanticide or elder euthanasia) for those who, through no fault of their own, do not or who have lost the capacity to reciprocate. Still, ethically and enforced legally, temporary or permanent conditions such as childhood or profound intellectual disability does not cancel association to the community of rights, only to avoid any such justification. For, if we don’t draw a clear boundary and enforce with some binding obligation to provide a protective shield around the whole group of human rights community, we may otherwise find ourselves on a slippery slope of denying equal moral consideration, rights and/or protections to those whose care is a burden on their family and the community.


It is not out of just sentimental attachment that we treat marginal human cases fairly well and with protection, or rights, and yes we believe it is morally wrong and unjust to abuse and kill vulnerable adults and children, but largely because of reciprocity. Indeed, parents and other adults do abuse children and medically vulnerable adults, but that is a breach of our social compact, and we punish those wrongdoers accordingly.


Marginal humans also still belong to the kind that does by nature and design reciprocate rights. The notion that marginal humans belong to the species or group or kind that typically does by nature reciprocate rights, has been criticized by “AR” as the Right-Kind argument, formulated by Tom Regan in response to Carl Cohen. This argument basically goes, 1. Individuals have rights if, and only if, they are a kind of being whose lives will be, have been, or remain essentially moral. 2. All, and only, humans are this kind of being. 3. Therefore, all and only, humans have rights. 4. Other animals are not human. 5. Therefore, other animals do not have rights. This is false vis a vis the reciprocity requirement. One is not basing rights on being human, per the conclusion that only humans have rights, other animals are not human, therefore, other animals do not have rights. One is saying that the capacity to reciprocate rights is the basis for having rights. Thus, being of a kind – that is of the kind that by nature and design - that possess the capacities necessary to reciprocate rights shall have rights. Humans have such capacities. Marginal humans who do not possess the capacity to reciprocate rights, still belong to the kind that does by nature and design reciprocate rights. Rights are not based on human species membership, as “AR” persistently argues. Rather, they are based on the capacity to reciprocate rights, so any species can have rights. It is just that for the present no other species besides humans can reciprocate at this level. Extant animal species cannot at all reciprocate at a societal level, only personally/instinctually. Reciprocity is the basis for rights, regardless of one’s species. Of course, when entities possess the capacity to reciprocate rights they are of a species that by design has that capacity or they belong to a species whose members typically have that capacity. Animals by nature and design do not have the capacity to reciprocate rights. If animals could reciprocate rights, even marginal animal cases would be included under rights of some kind and/or special legal protections the way humans are.


Marginal human cases cannot reciprocate or cannot tell right from wrong, thus, are not fully moral agents, just as animals are cannot and are not. This being the case, animal rights argue, as a matter of justice similar cases should be treated similarly. Thus, if marginal humans have rights, or partial rights, or legal rights-like protections regardless of the moral patienthood, then so should animals. As a rejoinder, others argue that animals and marginal human cases are not morally alike and, therefore, cannot be treated morally and legally alike in similar situations.


Indeed, if animals are morally similar to marginal humans with regard to both being “moral patients” and both being unable to reciprocate rights, as some animals rights advocates do declare, then rights would function the same way for both. Yet, in practice we do not intervene and discipline in the same way for both during similar situations, so there is no way that animals and children are similar in morally relevant respects. We know animals negatively exploit, attack and kill each other on a regular basis, but we do nothing. If we have any information that suggests that one child might kill another human being, we intervene. In the human-to-human situation, even a child will lose their freedom of bodily movement if they violate another child’s right or special legal protection to freedom from bodily harm. Unfortunately, there are such cases of child against child violence. In a similar intra-specific case, would a rights-holding chimpanzee lose his freedom of movement for violating another rights-bearing chimp’s right to freedom from bodily harm? Remember chimps are moral patients just like children, thus have basic rights, according to animal rights advocates. If a child tormenting and killing a kitten is certainly not morally right, is a well-fed house cat tormenting and killing a bird not right as well? Since human moral agents would have a moral duty to intervene if we see a child being stalked for attack by a mountain lion, would we not have the same duty to intervene if we see a deer being stalked for attack by a mountain lion? According to “AR” both children and deer are moral patients with basic rights and similar situations should be treated in a morally like manner, as a matter of fairness, ethical imperative, logical consistency, and justice. If you are attacked and eaten alive by a grizzly bear, did the bear violate your rights?


In practice, no human who maims and kills another human ever goes unpunished. Even among vulnerable human beings who cannot reciprocate rights are never as “innocent” as an animal that maims and kills another animal or human (granted though, some animals pay more dearly than humans for injuring and killing. E.g., in dangerous dog bites and mauling, a dog often pays with its life for injuring or killing people. But, the dog is still not considered morally or legally blameworthy). With humans that cannot or do not reciprocate rights, when they pose a threat to others or violate the rights of others, their conduct is never seen as “amoral” nor completely guiltless, and so the rights of others who have been wronged are said to be “violated” when infringed by said non-reciprocating human groups. The harmful acts of marginal humans are not considered amoral in the same way as the same or similar harmful acts of animals are. Though a child may be too young to recognize and respond to moral obligations, the child’s action does not lead us to conclude that there is nothing morally wrong with what she did. The capacity or degree to which the child is able to distinguish right from wrong shall influence our evaluation of her responsibility for her actions and of whether she deserves punishment or penalty and in what degree and form that punishment/penalty should take. But, it does not and should not lead one to conclude that there was nothing wrong or amoral with her action. In children, even the inability to distinguish right from wrong, though it may hold the child “innocent” in the sense of “not culpable” and not acting out of guilty mind, it does not leave the child’s actions innocent in the sense of being amoral or morally neutral, only that the child cannot or has limited ability to recognize right from wrong. Normally, we would discipline the child or explain that her action was not the right thing to do, and we would monitor more closely the child’s future behavior in that regard. That is because children do possess a rudimentary sense of right and wrong and over time the ability for reciprocity at a societal level. Right and wrong and reciprocity ares already there, wired into them. It just needs to be developed and refined.


If we treat actions by marginal humans differently and if we have no moral duty to intervene when animals do the same thing, there is no way we can claim that animals and marginal humans are equally deserving of moral regard and thereby, must have equal basic rights to life and freedom. If a very young child does commit a wrong it is appropriate to look upon her actions as morally wrong. In the case of a juvenile who commits a serious wrong in the form of a crime it is appropriate to deny or curtail her rights accordingly. The capacities of reasoning and understanding of rights by human children is far superior to that of the brightest nonhuman animals. Animals do not possess morality by nature, nor potential capacity for reciprocity, except on a personal or instinctual basis, but not a societal level which is needed for rights to be had and maintained. Thus, unlike with all humans, we don’t normally look upon animals as having the capacity to do moral wrong or commit a crime and so their actions don’t have moral and legal consequences. So, it makes no sense that they be accorded rights, because rights are a standard by which we judge behavior as right or wrong morally and legally, and if they are wrong, holders of rights must be liable and penalized by forfeiting some or all of their rights.


Some “AR” advocates point out the fact that our legal system treats “inanimate” entities such as trusts, corporations, and associations as legal persons with rights that may, therefore, sue and be sued. (Should Trees have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, by Christopher D. Stone). These “artificial persons” are held to have the same legal rights as we natural persons. The definition of a corporation, trust, association, partnerships, etc., comes from the idea of them being social entities, similar to groups of human beings. The fact is social entities are groups of natural persons (human beings) that function for the benefit of people, and it is this fact that gives the basis for according such entities (they are not that “inanimate”) legal personhood and, therefore, rights. Though, one would prosecute the company in name as distinct from its people executives. The bottom line remains, corporations are made up of people who reciprocate and, therefore, can have rights, and if they violate rights, they can be sued – though in name of the company - and people are punished and lose rights and other privileges. In other words, artificial persons must reciprocate to be in the social contract of rights. So, it is not much of an argument to justify animal rights in the way that corporations have rights.


Lest this turn into a book (I actually have more to say, but won’t), I’ll just end by saying that one does not have to be a fan of contractarianism or the social contract theory of ethics to recognise reciprocity as an important element in civilised human life (i.e., expectations of conduct enabling us individually and as a community to coexist and so thrive), and to recognize reciprocity as an important component to the concept of and preservation of rights. In animal rights philosophy, however, I believe that this two-way reciprocity element in the nature and function and maintenance of rights structure is sometimes ignored, or it is downplayed and trivialized. Rather than being a two-way street, “AR” wishes to have a separation of responsibilities from rights in one party who shall benefit from rights. I, personally, don’t think we should allow such decoupling of rights and responsibilities. Because the idea of separating rights from responsibilities would weaken the true meaning and efficacy of rights. I don’t think certain animals, in particular certain domestic food animals like chickens and pigs, have it good in this world. I still have not found a good argument for not killing animals for food and other human uses. But, my simple mantra is if your going to use and/or kill them, properly justify (which needs to be defined) that use/death to begin with and when so justified do it humanely. I think we can come up with a better way to institutionalize moral and legal considerateness for animals and provide a much higher and reasonable measure of legal protection by creating enforceable moral and legal duties more directly in regard to animals, increasing penalties for violations, much better enforcement, all without having to create a right in them, but something more than mere legal property, and without diluting the moral and legal impact of the true concept and proper function of rights.

May 6, 2007 11:24 AM

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20 comments:

Anonymous said...

Carol, you wrote: "If marginal humans have protections instead of rights, that doesn’t discredit the reciprocity argument either, because they have legal protections instead precisely because they are said to be unable to reciprocate. Both shoot down the argument that because marginal humans have rights or protections, then animals should too, because they are – in terms of their incapacity to reciprocate – morally the same."

The first statemenet here doesn't logically validate the second. As an argument that it does, you offer:

"Marginal humans also still belong to the kind that does by nature and design reciprocate rights. . . . One is not basing rights on being human, per the conclusion that only humans have rights, other animals are not human, therefore, other animals do not have rights. One is saying that the capacity to reciprocate rights is the basis for having rights. Thus, being of a kind – that is of the kind that by nature and design - that possess the capacities necessary to reciprocate rights shall have rights. Humans have such capacities."

This again is not logically sound. Or perhaps it's circular reasoning. You've said, "Rights aren't based on being human, but on being able to reciprocate rights" and then add, "only humans have that capacity." In other words, Only humans can have rights, because rights are something only humans can conceive. Hence rights are, it turns out, based on being human, and inclusion within the group granted rights depends upon which species one belongs to. Since no other species has the capacity to conceive of and reciprocate rights, ONLY humans can be granted them. Species demarcation does not in and of itself invalidate making a moral equation between nonhuman animals who do not have that capacity and functionally marginal humans who are given protection against exploitation.

Regardless, the problems you have raised with animal rights theory have been addressed in at least one essay that I know of: Elizabeth Anderson's "Animal Rights and the Values of Nonhuman Life," as found in the book "Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions." In keeping (more or less) with your criticisms, she states: "Rights bearers enjoy some rights not in virtue of their intrinsic capacities, but in virtue of their membership in human society, the requirements of standing in a particular sort of relationship to humans, or the interests of other people in standing in a certain relationship to the rights bearer." She then goes on to describe how we can learn about the "importance of reciprocity" with nonhuman animals by examining our relationship with trained horses and dogs, as described by Vicki Herne, a "philosophically sophisticated animal trainer." One of the "lessons" to be learned from these relationships is "the connection between having rights and the capacity to engage in mutual accomodation of interests, to adapt one's behavior in response to the claims, corrections, and commands of others." She then goes on to illustrate the importance of this capacity by considering the case of "vermin," that is, "beings whose interests are . . . fundamentally and essentially antagonistic to humans." She concludes that we have the right to exterminate such beings, whenever this is "necessary to protect ourselves" (though this doesn't give a license for cruelty).

She goes on to say, however, that "sensitivity to the social and natural conditions for grounding rights claims does not put all animals on the other side of the rights divide from us." And then outlines different scenarios possible or already existent between human and nonhuman animals, and how those scenarios place one or more groups of nonhumans ("vermin," domesticated animals, wild animals) on this or the other side of the rights divide. "Different rights emerge in different social contexts."

Anderson argues for a more nuanced approach to morality as applied to animal rights. I don't personally agree with all her conclusions; perhaps you wouldn't either. Still, I'm capable of recognizing the power of current attitudes, and how difficult it is to change those attitudes; hence I tend to favor the kind of approach Anderson contemplates. It moves beyond the kind of "stalemate" fighting both sides of the animal rights argument like to indulge in.

All this is by way of throwing down the gauntlet. Now that you've given your reasons for believing that rights as conceived of by most AR advocates are based on faulty reasoning, yet having also acknowledged that something between rights and protections (or however you've phrased it) should be granted animals, why not use your considerable intelligence, energy, and interest in defining exactly what those obligations/duties/protections/rights should be for the various parties involved? That's a book I'd be interested in reading - unless of course, you simply end up arguing in favor of the status quo, in which case . . . stalemate. Cuz there's a whole lot of people who don't agree with the status quo - and rightly so, imo; and they've got some pretty persuasive arguments to back themselves up with, also intelligence, energy, and interest to spare, your criticisms of their use of these notwithstanding.

Grizzly Bear said...

Hello
Thanks for your comments. I would however, like to take issue with some of them. Your characterization of the idea that reciprocation is the basis of rights as circular reasoning or not logically sound is wrong IMHO. It simply is not true that saying being a rights holder based on the ability to reciprocate is the same thing as saying being a rights holder is based upon being a member of Homo sapiens. Consider this. Suppose that tomorrow we discover a brand new species; we'll call it species X. Let's say it turns out that species X, though not human, and perhaps not even mammalian, can be proven to enter into a full, reciprocating moral relationship with human beings. Members of species X respect the rights of others and are able to rationally take responsibility for their actions. I would argue that in this case, since species X is a reciprocating entity, it is in fact a rights holding species just as much as Homo sapiens is, and thus is entitled to full membership in the moral community. As you can see from this hypothetical, being a rights holder based upon being able to reciprocate, and being a rights holder based upon being human are not in fact necessarily the same at all. I do not argue, and though I cannot speak for her, I don't think Carol would argue, that being a rights holder is simply based upon being a member of Homo sapiens. In your rebuttal, you seem to be using a faulty, fallacious "if A is true and B is true, then A+B is true" type of reasoning.

I must confess to ignorance in regard to Anderson's work, so I can't really make informed comment on it, perhaps other readers can. I will say this however, I have read writings on this subject by well known pro-AR academics such as Regan and I have yet to see any that can adequately address the reciprocation as the basis of rights argument without what I perceive to be serious factual and logical flaws. The inability to effectively rebut the reciprocation argument, is, IMHO, the most glaring weakness of AR ideology.

Thanks for your well thought out comments, though I do not agree with them. I hope that Carol, and perhaps other readers as well, will respond. Since this is a dated post, I will repost the link to it on the current page so everyone can read.

Anonymous said...

I understand that the point Carol (and you) are making is that the capacity to conceptualize rights is what's fundamental, and membership within a particular species is secondary, or even "accidental," to this. But I would raise two objections. 1)Unless you use such far-fetched notions as the possibility of space aliens coming to earth, or that some other species will soon develop the mental capacity necessary to formulate concepts such as "rights," the alleged insight that species membership is unimportant is really nothing more than a logical sleight-of-hand, imo. 2)Going back to the marginal cases argument, not all humans can conceptualize rights, yet are granted them (or protections). Yet though a trained dog might more nearly act as a rights reciprocator than a severely mentally retarded or deranged human, you (and/or Carol) would grant the human protections you would deny the dog. (To anticipate one possible objection: though Anderson speaks of "trained" dogs, it should be borne in mind that a dog may be trained specifically to perform properly during an experiment. The "training" may even constitute the experiment, as in the famous case in which dogs were "trained" to learn helplessness, via application of electric shock. In this case, the capacity of a member of a species other than ours to act in a manner similar to that of a rights reciprocator was specifically abused, purely on the grounds that it was not a member of our own species.)

I'm not here to argue the validity of the marginal cases argument, but to point out that it can be used to demonstrate one weakness in Carol's position.

Anonymous said...

Hi anonymous –



“The first statemenet here doesn't logically validate the second.”



My point simply was that, first, there is some dispute as to whether children (who have temporary or permanently undeveloped moral agency and the capacity to reciprocate rights), at least, have rights or if they have protections. Some say children have rights even though they cannot reciprocate rights. Others say children don’t have rights but rather protections, because children can’t reciprocate rights (they get rights when they are mature enough to reciprocate fully such rights).




I was talking about how one “AR” method of trying to justify animals having rights is by means of argument from marginal human cases, e.g., children. For “AR” children and animals are morally equivalent in their incapacity to reciprocate and their lack of moral agency (though, IMO, children do not lack moral agency, rather their agency is undeveloped). My second point, therefore, was that either way, whether children had rights or had protections, it still did not mean that animals could have basic rights or strong legal protections in the way children have. If one subscribes to the argument that children don’t have rights because they can’t reciprocate rights, why should animals get rights (when they don’t reciprocate either, and never shall, unlike children). Instead, children have legal protections. Animals have legal protections, too. But “AR” is about rights, not protections. If one subscribes to the notion that children do, indeed, have rights, it still does not mean that, therefore, animals should have rights. Because, when children, and adult so-called marginal human cases, fail to reciprocate rights they lose some or all of their rights. Also, we either grant children and other so-called marginal human cases rights and/or protections for reasons I have outlined in my post, most if not all are based on reciprocity (e.g., because we were once like them or could become like them, etc.), as well as for reasons that show animals and marginal human cases are morally not equivalent (e.g., humans become reciprocating agents and are so by nature and design whereas animals do not and are not) and we ethically treat animals differently from marginal human cases (e.g., we intervene if we know a child is being stalked by a mountain lion, but we do not intervene on behalf of a fawn though, according to “AR” the child and baby deer are both “moral patients”).



Hence, in the context of “AR” argument from marginal human cases, the reciprocity argument I outlined is not discredited if children have protections instead of rights. Children don’t have rights because they can’t reciprocate. Nor can animals, so animals surely don’t have rights either. If children have rights they have them because they shall become beings that can reciprocate rights, and all the other reasons given for including marginal human cases into the purview of equal moral consideration with rights/protections. Animals can never become and they never possessed the capacity to reciprocate rights. That was my line of reasoning.



“This again is not logically sound. Or perhaps it's circular reasoning. You've said, "Rights aren't based on being human, but on being able to reciprocate rights" and then add, "only humans have that capacity." In other words, Only humans can have rights, because rights are something only humans can conceive. Hence rights are, it turns out, based on being human, and inclusion within the group granted rights depends upon which species one belongs to. Since no other species has the capacity to conceive of and reciprocate rights, ONLY humans can be granted them. Species demarcation does not in and of itself invalidate making a moral equation between nonhuman animals who do not have that capacity and functionally marginal humans who are given protection against exploitation.”




First, human-human society runs on exploitation. Ideally, however, that exploitation is mutual/reciprocal.




I tried to make it clear that rights are not based on being human and rights are not based on species membership, especially membership of the species human. Any species can have rights if they have the capacity by nature to reciprocate rights. Humans are the only extant species that can and do reciprocate rights. I wrote that, of course, when entities possess the capacity to reciprocate rights, then they are of a species that by design has that capacity to reciprocate rights; iow, they belong to a species whose members typically have that capacity. And so, any species that typically is of the kind that can reciprocate on such a level, their marginal cases would also be included under the canopy of rights/partial rights and/or special legal protections. So, any entity can have rights if they can reciprocate them. If a nonhuman alien species had the capacities necessary to make rights function in a meaningful way, i.e., reciprocate rights, then they should be granted basic legal rights. It’s not being human that counts. It’s the ability to reciprocate rights, regardless of species. Please refer to GrizzlyBear’s post, for he explains it exactly.



“Elizabeth Anderson's "Animal Rights and the Values of Nonhuman Life," as found in the book "Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions." In keeping (more or less) with your criticisms, she states: "Rights bearers enjoy some rights not in virtue of their intrinsic capacities, but in virtue of their membership in human society, the requirements of standing in a particular sort of relationship to humans, or the interests of other people in standing in a certain relationship to the rights bearer."



I’m not familiar with Elizabeth Anderson’s writings. That’s fine what she says. Certainly, per Anderson, the nature of our natural and social relations we have with other people, “marginal” and “paradigmatic”, and the social meanings such relations have are all part of the richness of thinking about our human rights. I still think that basic legal rights are essentially contractual in nature and require reciprocity for them to function and have meaning at all. Regardless of how one stands in relationship to another or others, having rights and holding onto one’s basic rights depends upon respecting the basic rights of others.




“… She then goes on to describe how we can learn about the "importance of reciprocity" with nonhuman animals by examining our relationship with trained horses and dogs, as described by Vicki Herne ….”



This is reciprocation on a personal or instinctual level, not reciprocity at a societal level. I have a personal (not social) contract with my dogs, birds, and cat. Animals also enter into contracts and reciprocal relationships within their own conspecifics and may be said to do so between other nonhuman animal species. But, these are not the kind of reciprocal capacities required for social rights.




“Anderson argues for a more nuanced approach to morality as applied to animal rights. I don't personally agree with all her conclusions; perhaps you wouldn't either. Still, I'm capable of recognizing the power of current attitudes, and how difficult it is to change those attitudes; hence I tend to favor the kind of approach Anderson contemplates. It moves beyond the kind of "stalemate" fighting both sides of the animal rights argument like to indulge in.”



I did not find much in the way of quotes and essays online by Elizabeth Anderson, but I’ll keep searching. I see, she does endorse the notion of rights with responsibilities. She sounds like someone very worth reading and I appreciate your reference to her.



“All this is by way of throwing down the gauntlet. Now that you've given your reasons for believing that rights as conceived of by most AR advocates are based on faulty reasoning, yet having also acknowledged that something between rights and protections (or however you've phrased it) should be granted animals, why not use your considerable intelligence, energy, and interest in defining exactly what those obligations/duties/protections/rights should be for the various parties involved? That's a book I'd be interested in reading - unless of course, you simply end up arguing in favor of the status quo, in which case . . . stalemate.”



I’m not in favour of the status quo. Or, rather, I’ve yet to find a reasonable argument against humans producing, using, and killing animals for food (animal and plant), fur, research, testing, and medical practice, and the like. But, there are ways in which animals are used and treated for our purposes that I have a hard time justifying even though the laws exempt protection against or endorse such use and treatment of them.



I wrote the lengthy, and convoluted, post in response to an “AR” who said that the reciprocation/moral agency argument was “shamefully weak and immoral” and had been “thoroughly debunked” in “a hundred” philosophy texts and “AR” sites, and because Grizzly kindly said that I could do a guest post on the reciprocity requirement argument. Anyhoo, I’m still looking for that kind of book or essay as well. I wish I did have the ability to write an essay or book that defines what our moral and legal attitude and obligations ought to be towards animals, including expanding on the idea of animals having a status something between rights and property. There are different kinds of animals in so many different situations and who stand in different relationship to us and our situations and may require different treatment and moral/legal standing. Some have already defined, well, in my opinion, how and why we ought look upon certain animals in certain animal-animal and animal-human situations, like that of the relationship between indigenous hunting communities and wild animals, as well as sport hunting, motivations and justifications for hunting, our need for stewardship and wise-use – though there is much debate in these as well.


Respectfully,
Carol

Grizzly Bear said...

Hello Again

I take issue with your notion that my claiming that species membership is not particularly relevant is an "intellectual slight of hand". It is not. It is a factual statement of what I am arguing. I believe that accuracy and specificity is important here. I must say that I think if anyone is guilty of an "intellectual slight of hand", it is you, because you are trying to make it look as if I am arguing something I am not. I think that is marginally intellectually dishonest, dumbs down the discussion, and detracts from the credibility of your argument, and I think readers can see through it.

I think the comparison of a trained dog being closer to rights a reciprocator than a marginal human has a some serious flaws. First, a trained dog is simply not a rights reciprocator at all. A trained animal is conditioned, through reinforcement, either positive or negative, to perform, or not perform certain behaviors. This is NOT the same as being a rights reciprocator, which is based upon true free will, rational moral judgment, and personal responsibility. In fact, it's not even close. We own a macaw that will do some tricks. He performs these tricks because he knows he will get a peanut and a gleeful "good bird!" reaction in return, not because he thinks it is a good, right, and moral behavior to do so. This is a conditioned response only, it is not a form of reciprocation based upon free will and moral judgment.

Secondly, I think it is very important to note that marginal human cases often in fact do not full rights at all in comparison to fully rational rights reciprocators. Case in point. A person who is legally insane, i.e. cannot rationally discern between right behavior and wrong behavior, ( and is thus not a fully functioning reciprocator ) does not have the same rights as a normal person. The insane person does not have the right to liberty and freedom of movement. He/she must be confined or institutionalized because their inability to reciprocate rights is in fact what makes them a danger to society and to themselves, thus their rights are curtailed.

Anonymous said...

“ I understand that the point Carol (and you) are making is that the capacity to conceptualize rights is what's fundamental, and membership within a particular species is secondary, or even "accidental," to this.”


The capacity to reciprocate rights, yes, which would require other capacities like being able to conceptualize rights, and so on.


There can be a connection between species and the ability to reciprocate rights. For example, humans are a species that by nature and design are able to conceptualize and reciprocate rights. Just like there is a connection between being able to fly (like a bird) and being of the zebra finch species. Species and characteristics it possesses (some species-specific and not possessed by other species, other properties there may be overlap but sometimes still quantitative/qualitative differences) are inextricably bound. There is an interplay between species and characteristics, for a species has certain physiological characteristics that give rise to certain capacities and experiences. Species and anatomical/physiological differences give rise to internal, cognitive differences. What a creature does, can do, and experiences are dependent upon and arise from the stuff of which it is made and the organisations of its components – i.e., it’s biological makeup and biological species. In this sense, one could argue that species is relevant. E.g., an animal can suffer a certain way in certain situations that we may subject it to, because it is of a species with the requisite physiological properties that make it suffer that way. Suffering is morally relevant and it’s very morally relevant when we cause it. And we would have moral duties towards the animal and its suffering, like, e.g., to reduce or eliminate its suffering. So, species (with its attendant characteristics) is relevant when considering our moral duties and proper treatment of animals. We differentiate between species, between human and different nonhuman animal species, so as not to treat a domestic cow like a wolf, a dog so like a child, and so forth. Yes, I realize that we may be morally obliged to treat different human groups within the same species (e.g., children, women, men) differently from each other … But, if one is talking about characteristics such as the capacity to reciprocate rights and rational moral deliberation, for example, there are differences between humans and other animals.


“Unless you use such far-fetched notions as the possibility of space aliens coming to earth, or that some other species will soon develop the mental capacity necessary to formulate concepts such as "rights," the alleged insight that species membership is unimportant is really nothing more than a logical sleight-of-hand, imo.”



I would use the notion of an alien species, not to be sleight-of-hand, but to illustrate how species alone, particularly membership of and being human, is not the criterion for being granted basic legal rights. It is the capacity – to reciprocate. But, capacities are not disembodied from species. One who has the capacity to reciprocate is also of a species, a species that by design is able to reciprocate. As explained above.



Otherwise, such “far-fetched notions” are used because none have, as yet, been able to demonstrate that there are existing animal species other than our own that do indeed act in a manner similar to that of a rights reciprocator.


“Going back to the marginal cases argument, not all humans can conceptualize rights, yet are granted them (or protections).”


Not all marginal cases are granted rights because they cannot reciprocate rights. Some marginal cases have only limited rights based on their limited abilities. All marginal human cases who do not reciprocate rights lose some or all of their rights. Protections are something different, per my post on legal rights being a 2-way street with corresponding duties and protections without attendant duties to reciprocate on the part of the protection beneficiary. Some folks want all or some of the same protections for animals as given to children.


” Yet though a trained dog might more nearly act as a rights reciprocator than a severely mentally retarded or deranged human,”


I don’t think a trained dog acts anywhere near (however that is interpreted) to being a rights reciprocator. I don’t think one can train a dog to act or “nearly act” as a rights reciprocator. Dogs, as far as I know, have not shown themselves to be able to reciprocate with other rights-holding beings, and to deliberate on the consequences and take responsibilities for their actions (and whatever mental processes are required to reciprocate basic legal rights) to such a level.

“you (and/or Carol) would grant the human protections you would deny the dog.”


Severely mentally retarded humans who cannot reciprocate do not have rights. Deranged humans who do not reciprocate shall be denied some or all of their rights, depending on the rights infringement.


What does it mean to have a right? It means one can and does reciprocate, because for rights to function and be maintained at all they must be reciprocated. Some say those who have the potential to reciprocate should have rights when they can fully reciprocate. Children are wired to be able to reciprocate at a societal level – the capacity is in them in rudimentary form as it where; it just needs to be developed and refined. Dogs are not wired this way, and one cannot train a dog to understand rights and their consequences. What does it mean, in the human world, to be a rights-holder and then not reciprocate rights and so infringe upon another’s basic right? It means, in part, that one has committed a moral and legal wrong. A dog, trained or otherwise, we never say has committed a “moral wrong” or a crime. Even a human child is not “amoral” as the dog certainly is and children can be said to commit crimes.


“though Anderson speaks of "trained" dogs, it should be borne in mind that a dog may be trained specifically to perform properly during an experiment.”


But, can a dog be trained specifically to reciprocate rights, so that also, when it infringes upon another’s rights, could the dog be said to have committed a crime and a moral wrong? Rights are had so as to judge an infringement as wrong/criminal, with the victim having had a legal and moral injury, and with the transgressor being punished. One could train dogs to not harm people in certain ways, and I realize that well-socialised dogs may not harm people and other dogs, but I don’t see this as training them not to infringe upon basic rights with the dog being a reciprocator of rights. Not the way we guide young children to become responsible rights-bearing citizens and the way children already have rudimentary moral and social reciprocity capacities that we try to cultivate to a point where they can take full responsibility themselves. Full reciprocity is when one understand other’s rights and take full responsibility for one’s actions and be held accountable for them.

Submitted by Carol

Anonymous said...

"Animal rights" is a term used to cover a broad variety of ideas. But I think it's generally accepted that the fundamental right AR advocates seek for animals is the right not to be held as property and be exploited. When we apply such a "right" to mentally deficient/deranged/comatose etc humans, we might more strictly speak of it as a "protection," but we also say of such persons that they have a "right" not to be treated as property and exploited. Though you might argue that humans lacking the ability to conceptualize/reciprocate rights belong to a species which has that ability, and therefore might themselves be said to hold such a capacity in potentiality, the argument from marginal cases (AMC) would argue that this is not the reason we grant such persons protection against exploitation. The reason we offer such protection has less to do with their being human than it has to do with the fact that exploitation would violate such persons' innate dignity and, where applicable, their sense of selfness, and of personal well-being. AMC then suggests that, just as we grant such protection even to those who never have been and who, by all means of reasonable assessment, will never be able to comprehend/reciprocate rights, so we should grant it to nonhuman animals. Whether or not you (or I for that matter) believe AMC to be wholly or even partially valid, at least the argument should be understood correctly.

"I tried to make it clear that rights are not based on being human and rights are not based on species membership, especially membership of the species human. Any species can have rights if they have the capacity by nature to reciprocate rights. . . . It’s the ability to reciprocate rights, regardless of species. Please refer to GrizzlyBear’s post, for he explains it exactly."

I understand the point. My counterpoint is that, you've taken a quality (the capacity to conceive of and reciprocate rights) specific to humans, made an abstact concept of this quality, called that abstraction an "objective" principle, and then proposed to apply this principle to other species, none of which, except in fantasy, can meet the requirement set by your humanly derived abstract concept. This, imo, makes it impossible to take your argument seriously, or to see it as being rooted not only by nature but also by design in anything other than a species-specific viewpoint, for the specific purpose of allowing the continuation of animal exploitation.

Rights are, of course, species-specific. What AR seeks is, not to grant our species-specific rights to nonhuman animals, but to grant them protection from exploitation by humans. It does this via the argument that such a right should not be species-specific because such a right is not, even amongst humans, based solely, or fundamentally, on their being a member of one particular species (our own). If you are unwilling to agree with this (and I take it you not only are, but will likely continue to be, so unwilling), then at least one stalemate between us has been reached. Enter Anderson. I don't know to what degree I agree with Anderson, but at least she offers a new direction.

"I still think that basic legal rights are essentially contractual in nature and require reciprocity for them to function and have meaning at all. Regardless of how one stands in relationship to another or others, having rights and holding onto one’s basic rights depends upon respecting the basic rights of others."

From Anderson: "The authority relation that competent owners have over their dogs is a relation that itself must be earned through the coherent and responsible assumption of command, including a committment to respect the dog's 'right to the consequences of its actions.' One of these rights is to be disciplined . . . Applying the AMC in a manner not found in the standard animal rights literature, Herne [animal trainer] observes that the same rights and conditions on rights apply to humans, where the rights in question are 'civil,' or pertaining to the entitlements of freedom in human society. . . . Discipline ennobles the dog by establishing the reciprocal, cooperative relations through which it earns civil rights."

It's unfortunate the essay's not available online. It's fairly brief, but can't be safely condensed. Which leaves only purchase of the book if you're sufficiently motivated.

GrizzlyBear: "A trained animal is conditioned, through reinforcement, either positive or negative, to perform, or not perform certain behaviors."

"Conditioned" is one of those supposedly objective terms people like to use in order to reduce a given animal's autonomy to neglible proportions. Like calling distress calls of animals in laboratory settings "vocalizations." For "conditioned," one might substitute "managed," "disciplined," "coerced," "required," "forced." These terms apply to both positive and negative reinforcements. That these terms are more emotive than the one you've chosen is true enough, but unless one views nonhuman animals as being little more than machines or especially sophisticated plants, their applicability and appropriateness is fairly obvious to most (though not all) of us.

"He performs these tricks because he knows he will get a peanut and a gleeful "good bird!" reaction in return, not because he thinks it is a good, right, and moral behavior to do so."

Clearly he knows the behavior is "good" - for him - in that he has learned certain behaviors result in certain benefits. Again, he could aptly be described as knowing the behavior is "right," in that he has learned (ah, but you would say, only "conditioned") that one behavior results in a benefit to him, while other behaviors do not. No, he doesn't know it's "moral," as he doesn't have the concept. But then I don't suppose you'd call your own behavior moral or immoral either. Or perhaps you would argue that your keeping a bird is morally acceptable, and hence your behavior towards the bird is also morally acceptable. Anderson would cite this as a social relationship involving obligations on both sides.

Well, I feel as if I've made the points I came here to make, and have been at least partially heard, which is about the most I can reasonably expect from an anti-AR site. So I'll bid you both adios for now.

Grizzly Bear said...

"The reason we offer such protection has less to do with their being human than it has to do with the fact that exploitation would violate such persons' innate dignity and, where applicable, their sense of selfness, and of personal well-being."


Agreed. But do animals have "innate dignity" or a "sense of selfness"? If you are going to make such a claim to argue rights for them, then you are going to have to prove it.



"I understand the point. My counterpoint is that, you've taken a quality (the capacity to conceive of and reciprocate rights) specific to humans, made an abstact concept of this quality, called that abstraction an "objective" principle, and then proposed to apply this principle to other species, none of which, except in fantasy, can meet the requirement set by your humanly derived abstract concept. This, imo, makes it impossible to take your argument seriously, or to see it as being rooted not only by nature but also by design in anything other than a species-specific viewpoint, for the specific purpose of allowing the continuation of animal exploitation."


This is a classic example of a "circumstantial ad hominem fallacy". Person X ( me ) makes an argument. Person Y ( anonymous ) implies that person X makes an argument because it is in person X's own interests to do so, therefore person X's argument is invalid. Not particularly good reasoning.



"What AR seeks is, not to grant our species-specific rights to nonhuman animals, but to grant them protection from exploitation by humans."

Animals do not have a right to not be exploited by other animals. A rabbit does not have a right to not be eaten by a hawk, a rattlesnake, or a coyote. Why, therefore, should a rabbit have a right to not be eaten by a human either? What you are doing is singling out one species, H. sapiens, as the only species that is not allowed to exploit other species for its own benefit. This is actually a reverse form of "speciesism", the very "sin" that ARAs claim to hate so much. Quite ironic isn't it?


"No, he doesn't know it's "moral," as he doesn't have the concept. But then I don't suppose you'd call your own behavior moral or immoral either."

I certainly would call my own behaviors moral or immoral, because I posses moral judgment. The bird does not. A bizarre comment IMHO.



"Well, I feel as if I've made the points I came here to make, and have been at least partially heard, which is about the most I can reasonably expect from an anti-AR site. So I'll bid you both adios for now."


I think it's a little funny and ironic that you would claim that you "have been at least partially heard". You have been completely heard. I have censured none of your comments, and even back linked to a dated post so readers could find them. What's ironic is that many of us who are anti-AR are repeatedly banned or censured on pro-AR/vegan blogs, message boards, etc. Go to www.animalrights.net for an AR discussion board where neither pro or con viewpoints are censured by the moderator. Thanks again for your comments and feel free to comment any time.

Grizz

Anonymous said...

“"Animal rights" is a term used to cover a broad variety of ideas. But I think it's generally accepted that the fundamental right AR advocates seek for animals is the right not to be held as property and be exploited.”

Advocates of animal rights vary by what they mean by rights. Some mean moral/inherent/natural rights, others mean legal rights, or use moral rights to justify them being legal rights, while others mean legal protections, and others may mean something else. “AR” advocates need to be clear what they mean, because many “AR” advocates what these “rights” to be enforced in the body of laws. Which means it is too easily for the rest of us to construe them to be “legal rights,” which is something different from moral rights and legal protections.

“When we apply such a "right" to mentally deficient/deranged/comatose etc humans, we might more strictly speak of it as a "protection," but we also say of such persons that they have a "right" not to be treated as property and exploited.”

You may apply such a “right” to MHCs to mean moral or legal protection, or as a statement of what is proper conduct or the moral thing to do. But, there are “AR” and non-“AR” folks who think MHCs have legal rights. So, “AR” advocates will use the notion of rights to MHCs differently. There is also philosophical and legal literature on MHC moral rights, legal rights, and whether it is rights or protections that MHCs, especially children, have.

“Though you might argue that humans lacking the ability to conceptualize/reciprocate rights belong to a species which has that ability, and therefore might themselves be said to hold such a capacity in potentiality, the argument from marginal cases (AMC) would argue that this is not the reason we grant such persons protection against exploitation.”

I have said nothing to the effect that we grant marginal human cases protections if they have the ability to conceptualize/reciprocate rights/belong to a species which has that ability or potential. Of course this is not the reason we would grant such persons protections. One does not need to conceptualize/reciprocate rights in order to have protections.

The conversation initially was about rights for animals, not protections. I mentioned protections to show the difference between rights (that impose duties upon those who shall be rights bearers) and protections (that impose no duties upon beneficiaries of said protections, only upon those who can have such duties – normal adults/full moral agents). My mention of AMC was in the context of “AR” advocates using it in the context of granting animals rights – basic legal rights – and not protections. As I also mentioned in my original post, and as you mention, one sometimes does have to first discern what “AR” advocates mean by “rights.” Whether it is moral rights, legal rights, or some kind of protection similar to legal protections we afford to children and with almost the same legal clout as rights, or something else. It’s up to the “AR” advocate to say what s/he means, because for the rest of us rights mean legal rights. Some “AR” folks do mean legal rights, rather than protections, and refer to pro-“AR” legal writers.

“The reason we offer such protection has less to do with their being human than it has to do with the fact that exploitation would violate such persons' innate dignity and, where applicable, their sense of selfness, and of personal well-being. AMC then suggests that, just as we grant such protection even to those who never have been and who, by all means of reasonable assessment, will never be able to comprehend/reciprocate rights, so we should grant it to nonhuman animals.”

Since my post was in the context of reciprocity, I showed that the reason we offer limited legal rights (for some MHCs do have some rights) and/or legal protections to MHCs was also (but, you are right/correct that it is not the only reason) had to do with reciprocity. E.g., we could become comatose/mentally deficient/etc. ourselves; we may one day have or do have children of our own so we want children to have the protections and/or rights, and we were once children ourselves; etc. I do agree with the reasons you give. Also, though, some MHCs do not possess personhood with innate dignity, sense of selfness, and personal well-being (e.g., anencephalic infants), yet they still have protections, if and largely because their parents want such.

“Whether or not you (or I for that matter) believe AMC to be wholly or even partially valid, at least the argument should be understood correctly.”

I’m using the AMC, as coined by J Narveson, and the version I’m familiar with (by Lawrence Becker, from the book I have called Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases, by Daniel Dombrowski). One can look up online the definitions/formula/meaning of AMC; they seem to be similar or same - the ones I’ve looked up in the past. AMC may or may not be understood by those who converse about it, but AMC and protections/rights for MHCs are argued for and against differently by different advocates and opponents. There may be one way of understanding the AMC, but a few ways to argue in defense or against it even when understanding it the correct way, that may or may not be based on faulty or different understandings of AMC.

“I understand the point. My counterpoint is that, you've taken a quality (the capacity to conceive of and reciprocate rights) specific to humans, made an abstact concept of this quality, called that abstraction an "objective" principle, and then proposed to apply this principle to other species, none of which, except in fantasy, can meet the requirement set by your humanly derived abstract concept. This, imo, makes it impossible to take your argument seriously, or to see it as being rooted not only by nature but also by design in anything other than a species-specific viewpoint, for the specific purpose of allowing the continuation of animal exploitation.”

Legal rights - if one is talking about legal rights - imposes upon us a duty to effect that right, thus requiring the ability to reciprocate rights. That such a capacity is specific to humans and is an abstract concept, it is also a fact. (Rights are also abstract concepts, conceived only by humans, yet some try to impose them onto animals). Without reciprocity of rights, rights don’t mean anything. If we have the right to not be killed unjustly, my right to such is dependent upon you respecting and upholding that right, and my doing the same for you. It must be the same if animals are to have the right to not be killed unjustly. It’s not that it makes it impossible to take my argument seriously – and you haven’t even made an argument to show that legal rights do not require reciprocity –, rather it is that rights and rights reciprocity are impossible to apply to animals, without changing the power, nature and meaning of rights. Why do you think babies, very young children, and certain other so-called MHCs don’t have rights? Because, they can’t reciprocate on a level needed to respect and uphold rights. Not because we want to (immorally) “exploit” them.

We have to be clear by what you mean by animal exploitation. Humans exploit humans much of the time. But, as I said, ideally, such exploitation is mutual and reciprocal in nature. Though, e.g., children may be used in research without their consent; consent of a parent or other legal guardian is required. Still, my own history of reading on animal rights/welfare/liberation and belief in animal rights (and I meant legal rights, not moral rights, and not the strong protections that children have because I always thought that children actually had rights), I believe I sort of know what you mean.

I do exploit animals, oftentimes for mere convenience. I eat home-grown veganic, organic and commercial vegan food, the production of which sometimes maims and kills sentient animals. Otherwise, I have no reason to want to continue exploiting animals for animal food, at least, e.g., even though I still can’t find a reasoned argument for not killing animals for animal food. I believe my reciprocity requirement for rights argument, or the way I’ve interpreted it, is not based on my justifying allowing the continuation of exploiting animals in such a way that is not beneficial to them as living individuals. It’s not that I want to continue allowing the “exploitation” of animals, just as we don’t grant rights to children and other MHCs because I and others want to (immorally) exploit them and kill them without just cause. It’s that you, and others who advocate rights, have not provided a reasoned argument for animal rights that can be properly and more-or-less consistently applied. Maybe the language of rights is not the proper one to use. Now, welfare and/or strong protections based on duty/care ethics and Anderson’s approach (but without the language of rights), we have yet to argue on that.

“Rights are, of course, species-specific. What AR seeks is, not to grant our species-specific rights to nonhuman animals, but to grant them protection from exploitation by humans.”

For some “AR”, these protections, they mean, in the form of rights. “AR” advocates need to be clear what they mean, whether legal rights, moral rights, or the kind of strong legal protections that children have. And, then, they need to argue for them, convincingly and reasonably.

I’m aware that “AR” advocates do not seek to grant species-specific rights such as the right to a university education or the right to drive a care (which, I don’t see as “rights”, but conditional ‘privileges’ or something, but not rights, and certainly not basic legal rights), if that is what you mean. If this is not what you mean, my apologies. Anyway, I’m referring to basic rights, e.g., the most basic right to not to be killed without just cause that humans have and which “AR” advocates would like to have granted to sentient animals. This right may be covered under your “protection” from being exploited by humans – as in, protected from being killed for human benefit, like for food, as research tools, e.g.

“It does this via the argument that such a right should not be species-specific because such a right is not, even amongst humans, based solely, or fundamentally, on their being a member of one particular species (our own). If you are unwilling to agree with this (and I take it you not only are, but will likely continue to be, so unwilling), then at least one stalemate between us has been reached.”

I’m will to agree with you that a right need not be species-specific for reasons that rights are not based on being a member of one particular species. I also say that in order for a right to be meaningful to those who have said right, that right needs to be respected by those who have said right.

So, if animals have the right not to be exploited and killed by humans, I would like that same right not to be exploited and killed by animals – otherwise you are denying my species of such a fundamental right. Also, if a right should not be species-specific, then all animals who shall be granted rights have the right to not be exploited and killed by other animals, humans and nonhumans, who shall have the same right, otherwise we are unfairly discriminating between the species. For, rights to have meaning for everyone involved, all of us have to be able to respect each other’s rights, and be held accountable when rights are infringed. Rights are a two-way street. If you mean to change this fundamental nature of rights in practice, then you speak of something else, which is fine and you need to develop that. But don’t talk in the vein of rights because when “AR” want to “enforce as law” “rights” (and I’m assuming that you want whatever it is/your form of “rights” to be made into law) that means legal rights = reciprocity.


“From Anderson: "The authority relation that competent owners have over their dogs is a relation that itself must be earned through the coherent and responsible assumption of command, including a committment to respect the dog's 'right to the consequences of its actions.' One of these rights is to be disciplined . . . Applying the AMC in a manner not found in the standard animal rights literature, Herne [animal trainer] observes that the same rights and conditions on rights apply to humans, where the rights in question are 'civil,' or pertaining to the entitlements of freedom in human society. . . . Discipline ennobles the dog by establishing the reciprocal, cooperative relations through which it earns civil rights."”

This is an example of reciprocity on a personal level, between dog trainer/caregiver/owner and the dog. This is similar to the reciprocal relationship between a toddler, or older child maybe, and a parent/relative. It is not an example of reciprocity on a societal level – e.g., between said dog and other human beings in free and accountable society. Again, some MHCs do not have rights, and others have only limited rights based on their limited ability to reciprocate rights. I can see Anderson’s approach that disciplining a dog does help to establish the reciprocal and cooperative relations through which h/she earns the “right” to the guardian’s care of him/her. Same for a child. And, by taking in a dog or a child we’ve taken on responsibilities for their care and they are owed such because we took them on. You don’t get a dog or have a child and then do nothing for their welfare. Social/legal rights, on the other hand, require a very different level of reciprocal and cooperative relations, I do believe. I still stand by what I wrote on the reciprocal nature of rights. It’s also why we don’t grant rights to children, until they can reciprocate at that societal level. Why would dogs have rights, but not children? Note, some do argue that children should have rights.

“It's unfortunate the essay's not available online. It's fairly brief, but can't be safely condensed. Which leaves only purchase of the book if you're sufficiently motivated.”

I’m sure I’ll somehow get hold of the book with her piece in it, and I’ve found some quotes and references to her online. I’m interested in what she means by rights. I saw a blurb about approach, saying that we need to consider animal welfare in terms of having sympathy for animals, and an attitude of wonder of nature (in re our philosophy of environmentalism). Animal rights she says is respect for animals. Her approach is one of what the “evaluative attitudes it is rational” for us to take toward animals – things like “sympathy, admiration, awe, and respect” – and ground rights claims for animals on that. This reminds me of things I’ve already read. But, may be not, and I’m excited to know that she may have a different approach to the matter and I hope that I can first just understand what she is saying and go on from there.

Otherwise, I’m not convinced that rights based ethical and legal language is appropriate for animals. I kind of like some – not all - the eco-feminist care ethics, though. But, I’d be interested in what Anderson has to say about different kinds of reciprocity and reciprocity in animals, and also how she thinks the way we look at animal rights (in terms of how we approach basic human legal rights, why we think we have rights, how they come about, and how they are maintained, etc.) is inadequate or limited, and how she justifies her approach for rights, and what these rights are. I think there are actually very few basic rights, but Anderson seems to talk about a whole bunch of need rights (like the right to be fed, veterinary cared, live in the house with your caregiver). Such need rights, to be meaningful to those who shall have them, also need to be protected by the most fundamental of rights, which is the right to not be killed without just cause. E.g., to borrow from another writer (I don’t know who), if we say a turkey has the (need) right to be fed properly, it is a pointless right if we are allowed to fatten it up and kill it for a Sunday roast. This is why I use the basic legal right not to be killed without just cause more often.

Also, in terms of need rights: Anderson says, for example, that a dog has a right to live in the house (of its owner, I guess). First, I don’t have a right to a house or a shelter, and no one is under any obligation to give me a shelter. But, second, because I have satisfied certain conditions that myself and landlord have agreed upon, I am permitted to live in the house we currently rent. But, we talk of tenant rights and landlord rights. Sometimes, I think we say rights this and rights that, when there are really very few basic legal rights, imo. And, it is these rights that I refer to for animals, because, again, it makes little sense to say one has a right to shelter, or to be fed, to drive a car, etc., unless that right is protected by not being killed in the process. Now, I’m just going off … …

Again, thanks for the book source. Also, thank you for your very interesting and challenging posts. Carol

Anonymous said...

Hi, it’s me again. Anonymous said: "What AR seeks is, not to grant our species-specific rights to nonhuman animals, but to grant them protection from exploitation by humans."

So, you are basically saying that nonhuman animals have the right to not be exploited (whatever that means) by humans. Humans, however, do not have the right to be protected from exploitation by animals. Also, rights-holding animals don’t have rights to not be exploited by their conspecific rights-holding members or other rights-holding nonhuman animals. This is because, you say, I think, animals cannot be expected to reciprocate in such a way towards humans and nonhuman animals. Thus, animals cannot be expected to respect rights and so cannot be expected to not to exploit humans, their fellow conspecifics, and other nonhuman animals. Only humans can be expected to respect the right not to exploit others.

It seems, to me, very one-sided and you don’t seem to adequately justify it, to grant one group such a fundamental basic right as to not be negatively exploited in a particular way by another group, while deny the latter group the same fundamental right. Rights, to be effective, normally have to function as a two-way street. All groups that shall have rights shall at least have the basic rights and hold them equally. Because they are such basic rights and because a right to be protected from certain conduct by an other is dependent upon that other receiving the same treatment. That seems, to me, only fair. Unless you believe criminals should keep their rights and MHC like children should have full rights. In addition, it does not make sense to me to say that, e.g., and which I think you are saying, the right of one animal group A (mice) and another animal group B (cats) not to be exploited by another rights-holding animal C (human) is valid, but the same right becomes invalid or evaporates if the social relationship is between animals A and B, and/or when its animals A/B exploiting animals C. The power and influence of a basic right does not change with difference in place, time, and circumstance among rights-holders in a society where those rights shall be had. That is, a right possessed by parties maintains the same force and validity for everyone that posses that right, regardless of which right-holding individuals one interacts with and under what circumstance or social relationship one has with said rights-holders.

Why is it wrong for humans to exploit – whatever you mean by that term – animals in the first place that they should be granted rights against such? By what rationale should we have to change the nature of legal rights? Saying that it’s because nonhuman animals can’t be aware of their rights and the rights of others and cannot reciprocate rights the way human rights-holders can, or the way they need to, I don’t think is enough; considering that we don’t give rights to or we take them away from humans who can’t or don’t reciprocate. We may, indeed, have direct responsibilities to protect animals from certain exploitative treatment, but why should these protections be framed in the form of basic legal rights, rather than by some other legal mechanism?

Interestingly, while in my online search for Elizabeth Anderson’s essay and commentary thereof there was one observation made that she does not at all mention intensively raised farm animals in her essay, as if they are less deserving or less likely to engender the same degree of admiration and respect as a pet dog or a wild bird of prey, that is, the kind of “wonder and awe” in which she wants us to ground our highest moral considerations of animals. I think “AR” advocates would consider these farmed food animals most in need of protection from human “exploitation” as the mass breeding/killing/breeding of them and their utter dependence upon us perpetuates the animals’ property status and exploitation. But, during my search, I also happened upon mention of a David Favre, professor of animal law in Michigan, who, by drawing from equity and guardianship law, proposes a way to modify, rather than eliminate, the concept of living property ownership. By dividing the concept of title into legal and equitable categories and then awarding the equitable title to the animal, some degree of self-ownership can be allowed without destroying the acknowledged relationship between animal and human. Such would recognise animals as having equitable self-ownership, able to enjoy greater legal protections (not rights), assuming that the modified status would be an impetus for better laws and tighter enforcement of new and old animal welfare statutes. Also, caregivers would retain their legal title to the animals, making them more directly responsible for animal interests, while still able to use them. Also, it would allow for owners to bring legal action in their animal’s name in the event of their animal’s unjustified mistreatment, injury or death, as well provide a basis for private parties to bring an action on behalf of an animal to enforce the obligations directly owed to it. (Oh my, the possibility of so many frivolous lawsuits to clog up the courts with an already backlog of human cases). A summary is explained by Joseph Lubinski at http://www.nabr.org/AnimalLaw/Personhood/IntroToAR.htm , with Favre’s essay at http://www.animallaw.info/articles/arusfavreequitabletitle2000.htm . I’ve only quite recently come across the idea and have not researched it, but it sounds like an interesting counterbalance to Gary Francione’s and Steven Wise’s writings.

“"Conditioned" is one of those supposedly objective terms people like to use in order to reduce a given animal's autonomy to neglible proportions.” …. For "conditioned," one might substitute "managed," "disciplined," "coerced," "required," "forced." These terms apply to both positive and negative reinforcements. That these terms are more emotive than the one you've chosen is true enough, but unless one views nonhuman animals as being little more than machines or especially sophisticated plants, their applicability and appropriateness is fairly obvious to most (though not all) of us.”

I disagree some. Conditioning is a type of learning theory and a type of training method. It is learning that things go together, that one thing is related to another. GrizzlyB’s macaw bird performing tricks results in receiving a peanut and praise from him is a perfect example of conditioned response behavior. Its learning by association; meaning positive associations (or rewards) increase behavior, and negative associations (no reward or unpleasant feedback) decreases behavior. For a more complex task, you can break it down to its component parts and teach each step by step separately, giving rewards or not along the way. This is conditioning.

For animal trainers and pet owners conditioning denotes a way that animals learn and, thus, can be trained. It does not have to denote that those animals being trained, with their way of learning and behaving, have limited autonomy and are mere unthinking, unfeeling stimulus-response machines. Though its classical format is called instrumental conditioning or stimulus-response teaching, which may imply, to you, that the subjects of learning are seen as mere machines. But, it’s really a way the animal is taught and a way it learns (which requires active participation, knowledge, and because it is largely repetition, requires memorization, i.e. rote learning) to do something in order to get what it wants. Sometimes what causes the behavior may be mere mechanistic association (like dogs salivating at the sight of food), but other times the conditioned response is one where the animal uses its consciousness in a way that it can perceive and think about the consequences of the stimulus, thus knowing, in its way, something is good or bad for it. In many ways, we are conditioned, too; for we quite often do things because we get or think we get something good in return (sometimes it is reflexive, other times it is much more thought out). I think that was the main theory behind conditioning, doing something to get what one wants or is good to one. It is a mechanistic way of teaching and learning and is limited if one is studying how certain animals think and learn naturally in their normal habitat including in a human-animal setting. Much of conditioning is trial and error learning, which can be disastrous for survival in the wild, e.g., and in a training/teaching session the animal simply does more of the behaviors it gets rewarded for doing, and less of those behaviors it’s been negatively reinforced. But, animals also do a lot of observational learning, especially from other animals and animal role models, and they get rewards (food, shelter, mates, etc.) also by being highly attuned to the visual environment (they must be very visual thinkers). That’s why there is also the social modeling theory or rival/model technique (Dr. Iren Pepperberg developed the method in her research on animal learning with her African gray parrot, Alex). Marian Stamp Dawkins says true cognition is not hard-wired instinctual behavior, and not learning a simple “rule of thumb,” or a conditioned response, but the ability of an animal to think in a flexible manner in novel situations. I think lots of animals fit this profile. I also think that conditioning is still an important and valid way for human owners/guardians to work with to understand learning behavior and to train and appropriately discipline and socialize certain domestic and captive-bred animals.

Humane conditioning with animals is not about managing via despotic dominion over or coercing nor forcing the animal into doing something that it does not want to do. You may argue that cows and pigs don’t want to be killed for food by humans. I’m not sure that they understand that they are going to be killed or in a slaughterhouse about to be killed with their conspecifics. They do sense and feel pain and they fear, however, which means we should minimize or eliminate such. Some animals, like dogs, have to learn rules of human social settings and how to maintain them, and they are able to learn instinctively and consciously/thinkingly (just differently and not as complexly as we do) because they are pack animals anyway, hyper-social predators who live in dominance hierarchies, and they have evolved with us – having learned how to read us and we them, in our human environments; their natural environment is the human family and/or other human social settings. I think most conditioning teaching methods are reward-motivated training without punishment. However, there are undesirable behaviors, in dogs, for example, that have a strong instinctual motivation, but need to be prevented or re-channelled for the sake of the dog’s and caregiver’s wellbeing. E.g., jogger, car, and deer chasing, which can be common since dogs do have a prey chase drive. Such dangerous or undesirable behaviors may respond better to “punishment” such as electronic fences, shock collars. There is also obedience training with imitation of natural instinctual behavior to exert dominance. But this is not “forced” or “coerced.” Such is used because dogs respond to vocal and physical signals of dominance and submission. To illustrate, I recently saw a gentleman whose leashed German shepherd dog snapped, unprovoked, at another leashed small poodle-mix walking by (I’m not sure if the shepherd perceived it as unprovoked or justified, but in our society it was unprovoked and we normally find dogs snapping or attacking other dogs as unacceptable). The owner of the shepherd said “no!” and signaled to his dog to lay down, held the dog down for a few seconds, but then was able to look and gesture to it to stay down on its own. It had to stay in that side-lying position for a while, until the owner said it could “up!” and continue walking. It looked harsh and forced, but this kind of exertion of dominance with submissive response ritual happens among highly social animal packs like wolves and dogs all the time. It is not a fear or pained demeanor the dog exhibits. It is submission and surrender, neither of which, I suspect, have a negative or “bad” connotation for dogs.

Dogs, who have evolved in packs with dominant-submissive hierarchies to keep the peace, but who are neotonized and essentially bred to be permanently immature, they have a natural instinct and desire to defer to the (benevolent) will of a pack leader. Though I see my role as that of a surrogate parent to my dog, I also know that the proper role we take on with dogs is really that of a pack leader and positively persuading the dog to give in to our will without a contest, as it were. It’s not a power struggle (though it can be with a very dominant aggressive dog), but of positive persuasion to hone the dog’s natural instincts and abilities it was bred for to live and work with us and learn rules we set for it that promotes its wellbeing and that of other dogs and animals, as well as in the wellbeing of the human caregiver and other humans.

Negative or positive reinforcers just mean removing an element already there or adding a new element, respectively. “Positive” does not necessarily mean it shall cause happiness for the animal or is a “good” in the sense that the animal will get a treat or something. It can be an addition like a whistle or a clicker to get the animal’s attention, the sound of which the animal can associate with getting something nice, to it, or is a signal for an expected behavior or task. Similarly, “negative” does not necessarily mean something “bad” such as physical punishment causing unpleasant feedback like pain or fear. It just means something isn’t there that was, like a treat or toy.


“Clearly he knows the behavior is "good" - for him - in that he has learned certain behaviors result in certain benefits. Again, he could aptly be described as knowing the behavior is "right," in that he has learned (ah, but you would say, only "conditioned") that one behavior results in a benefit to him, while other behaviors do not.

I think you are both correct. You have kind of re-phrased what GrizzlyB said. Learning that certain behaviours result in certain benefits – just like. Grizzly’s example with his macaw – is conditioned learning. The positive reinforcement (reward) makes the animal happy in receiving what it wants. There is a desire to perform for the reward. So yes, I think it is reasonable to say that the macaw knows the behavior will get him he likes in return. The behavior is a learned response, i.e., a conditioned response. In training and understanding why animals behave the way they do one also needs to know the motivations for different behaviors. Animal behavior is a combination of learned behaviors, biologically based emotion, and hardwired instinctual behavior. Considering what we know of some birds’ and mammals’ ability to use previously learned knowledge to solve new problems and ability to handle in new situations, without human training, I wouldn’t rule out their ability to think things out as well.

“Anderson would cite this as a social relationship involving obligations on both sides.”

It is, but it’s not symmetrical like the relationship involving rights and corresponding duties. Again, while the relationship between pet animal and human caregiver is reciprocal, it’s not a reciprocal relationship at a societal level that is required for respecting social rights. Though it probably applies to animals in general whose lives are somehow joined with that of humans, I’ll use the example of dogs, because I have dogs and I think they are excellent examples of reciprocity as they are highly social and have evolved and been bred to work and live with us, and, as Vilmos Csanyi said, are “interested in the emotional and intentional content of the human mind and they are able to learn and to maintain the rules of human social settings” I don’t know enough about macaws. We do have zebra finch birds, however, though extremely social birds, they have to a large extent retained the behaviour of wild birds and keep a greater distance from humans, whom they will not and cannot accept as substitute companions in the absence of other members of their own species. So, they are essentially observational birds, always stay relatively wild and shy, and, therefore, can’t be hand tamed and trainable, or as reciprocating as other birds, like parrots, or as other household pets like dogs.

Anyhoo, basically dogs live in society usually with a human caregiver/owner, and only because that relationship is maintained by constraint and training. That is, the human-dog relationship is mostly conditional upon the dog being under supervision and control of its human caregiver. The dog’s relationship to humans is largely in a socially dependent way. Also, dogs, like most pet animals, are in a state of dependence on its human caregiver for its welfare, rather like a child (and children don’t have rights because rights impose responsibilities on one which a child cannot reasonably be expected to shoulder). Though, of course, domestic pets and animals are not children and should not be treated as such. It’s argued, that the relationship between blind people and guide dogs allow such dogs to cooperate with the humans to negotiate difficult situations, and such dogs are trained to take control when the need arises. Regardless, our responsibilities to our dogs come from their dependancy on us – since their co-evolution with man and our having bred them to be dependent on us. I take on most of the responsibilities. My responsibilities are to care and protect them because I took them in in the first place and because they give me companionship, guardianship of the home, someone to love and care for, and more, and so I in return feed, care, exercise, love and play with them, give them leadership and protection. My dogs don’t reciprocate beyond the social relationship they have with husband and I, and some relatives and friends. If you and your dog were invited over to my home, my dogs are ready to bite you and altercate with your dog. This, I don’t think is too unusual for even obedience-trained household dogs, for dogs are often loyal to their family pack and can perceive outsiders of the pack as intruders and threats. Of course, it is only my being there that my dogs would not bite you and they do not altercate with dogs that I allow on the property. Moreover, however, where my dogs to be let loose outside on the streets, without my supervision of them, with free-roaming humans and other human-controlled and free-roaming rights-holding dogs, they may not be very civilized. In sum, my dogs are involved in a reciprocal relationship with me, so I have responsibilities towards them and I instinctively grant them welfare “rights”, but they are not legal rights. To the rest of society, however, no reciprocal relationship exists. Unlike the reciprocal relationship that exists between humans, strangers and all.


Again, rights are moral and legal equalizers. To have rights means one stands in equal relation to other rights-holders in society and under the law, and one has equal capacity and responsibility to act in such a way that one understands the benefits of the social contract/rights and shall act accordingly to respect, maintain and uphold rights, and failing to do that, forfeit the benefits. So, among rights-holders in society the relationship is not one of controller/parent and controlled/dependent nor an “authority relation … over” (Anderson). But this is how it is and must be between humans and dogs, because dogs are physically and psychologically dependent upon us. Also, because they can only act out of desire and learn to understand their limitations with their caregivers, but outside their family pack.


A symmetrical and reciprocal relationship at a societal level is one where beings are able to respect the other’s personal jurisdictions because we can reasonably hope and demand that others will show one the same respect. Dogs and other animals are not capable of this kind of agency. Before human and animal interests collide, we cannot hope to use moral and reasoned argument to persuade animals to understand what the legal and moral jurisdictions of each involved are. And when human and animal interests do conflict, we cannot expect to reason with them, nor they with us, to accept some reasonable compromise like we usually can with humans. Sometimes, we can prevent a dog from encroaching upon our welfare interests and certain rights. But, most of the time dogs’ behaviors do not indicate that they can be left to their own devices to not intrude, threaten, or invade rights-holding jurisdictions, and a dog owner and behaviorist/trainer cannot train dogs to behave independently at this level. We can, however, rely on human capacity to participate and keep societal agreements by conducting themselves as expected. Dogs do not reciprocally behave in such a way with society outside their established family pack.


A rights-holder has responsibilities, because rights come with responsibilities. In order to have responsibilities that go with rights, a being with rights is one that must know what they have a right to do and what they do not have the right to do. One must know what rights others have, so one can be sure not to violate them. If one cannot determine what the rights of others are, one cannot know the scope of one’s own rights, and one cannot act with certainty that one is doing one’s duty. So, equal socially reciprocating agents are ones who must also be held morally and legally responsible for their actions. If dogs shall have rights, then they obviously are also responsible for respecting those rights as they exist in both other dogs and other rights-holding animals, including humans who have rights (for not all do). (That all animals who shall have rights and humans have, at minimum, the same basic rights has been explained at the beginning). Unlike human rights-holders, dogs and other animals, though they can intentionally invade or threaten a rights-holder, cannot be held liable nor be considered to have acted criminally, because dogs and animals have no moral and legal responsibilities. As such, nonhuman animals cannot be expected to be granted basic legal rights.


Mary Anne Warren accepts that animals do not possess rationality, a morally relevant attribute for having full, autonomous moral agency which helps us to negotiate and reciprocate rights. She seems to argue for animal rights based on the mistaken premise that we grant “equal” basic rights to “human infants and mentally incompetent persons.” (She speaks of “moral rights” as a “significant moral claim” that I reckon she wants legally enforced). Warren also argues that animal rights are weaker than the same human rights. That is, “The rights of most nonhuman animals may be overridden in circumstances which would not justify overriding the rights of persons.” In other words it would be okay for the farmer to kill rodents running about in a wheat field as he harvests the wheat, but not okay to do the same if there were children running about. I think Elizabeth Anderson’s argument seems to justify the same, when she suggests that the rights of a rat can be overridden when its behavior does not accommodate the interests of humans, unlike that of a dog that can take responsibility, as it were, for following human rules. This, imo, is unsatisfactory. For basic rights are absolutely inviolable that should not be overridden except only rarely and in the most exceptional circumstances. To have basic rights which can be so consistently overridden at what amounts to mere whim, such renders the notion meaningless.


"Well, I feel as if I've made the points I came here to make, and have been at least partially heard, which is about the most I can reasonably expect from an anti-AR site.”


You have been read, and I think our three minds are open and unprejudiced enough to have listened and so to have understood what each was meaning to say. Just because one does not agree does not always have to mean that one has refused to listen and understand or only half heard what the other has said. For me, its not that I’m unwilling to agree with you. I’d like nothing more to see animals not be produced on farms and slaughtered by humans, out of research and test labs, and have much tighter enforced protections, e.g. Rather, you don’t offer, for me, a philosophically and practically well-grounded argument for animal to have legal rights that protect them from human “exploitation.”

Respectfully submitted. CarolWR

Anonymous said...

A few quick comments:

Carol: "It seems, to me, very one-sided and you don’t seem to adequately justify it, to grant one group such a fundamental basic right as to not be negatively exploited in a particular way by another group, while deny the latter group the same fundamental right."

I don't know offhand of any examples wherein nonhuman animals may exploit humans, and humans are left with no recourse but to accept the exploitation. You would need to provide such an example in order for me to consider the point.

"In addition, it does not make sense to me to say that, e.g., and which I think you are saying, the right of one animal group A (mice) and another animal group B (cats) not to be exploited by another rights-holding animal C (human) is valid, but the same right becomes invalid or evaporates if the social relationship is between animals A and B, and/or when its animals A/B exploiting animals C. The power and influence of a basic right does not change with difference in place, time, and circumstance among rights-holders in a society where those rights shall be had."

Ah, well, it is not I but Anderson who brings in the "social relationship" concept; and I did not bring Anderson into the conversation because I agree with her on all points, but because I thought she offered an interesting new perspective. Anderson starts with the idea that social contexts are important to understanding rights claims. And her conclusion is indeed that "Different rights emerge in different social contexts." She doesn't however consider relationships between mice and cats to be "social" because that term is meant to apply only to humans and their relationships (with other humans, or with nonhumans), at least when talking about rights issues. Rights, being formulated by humans, can't exist without a human being taking part in the rights relationship. As to mice or cats "exploiting" humans, rights do not then become invalid. That is, Anderson would say that if mice were negatively impacting humans, we would have the right to exterminate them. Same with cats I suppose (feral ones). Cats in the home (or mice kept as pets) would be taking part in a social relationship, and would have certain rights, as governed by the nature of that relationship.

"Why is it wrong for humans to exploit – whatever you mean by that term – animals in the first place that they should be granted rights against such?"

But you know the answer to this one, it's standard: sentience, autonomy, ability to suffer, etc.

"By what rationale should we have to change the nature of legal rights?"

I don't agree that we would have to change the nature of legal rights, only extend them to a group previously denied them. As has been done before. I realize that previous groups denied then granted rights have all been humans. But the point is that rights have proven flexible in the past; AR asks that that flexibility be again utilized to include nonhumans. The basis for the request being that inclusion in a specific species is not the key reason for granting rights.

"Saying that it’s because nonhuman animals can’t be aware of their rights and the rights of others and cannot reciprocate rights the way human rights-holders can, or the way they need to, I don’t think is enough; considering that we don’t give rights to or we take them away from humans who can’t or don’t reciprocate."

We grant them the basic right not to be exploited. We don't take away from them the basic right not to be exploited.

"We may, indeed, have direct responsibilities to protect animals from certain exploitative treatment, but why should these protections be framed in the form of basic legal rights, rather than by some other legal mechanism?"

I don't agree that granting nonhuman animals the basic legal right not to exploited would not answer the case. In other words, I see no reason why they should not be framed in the form of basic legal rights.

"Interestingly, while in my online search for Elizabeth Anderson’s essay and commentary thereof there was one observation made that she does not at all mention intensively raised farm animals in her essay"

I wondered about that myself. However, Anderson is not precisely a pro-rights writer. She is willing to admit, for instance, that while there exists a "powerful claim" to protect "animals against cruel treatment, even for compelling purposes," she also believes that when that purpose involves, for instance, medical experimentation that would benefit humans, "a far more nuanced moral theory" needs to be developed in order to ascertain whether it's humans or nonhumans who have the greater claim. She does however state: "Third, a condition on having a right to be incorporated in human society is that life with humans is necessary to the animal. This places domesticated animals on the human side of the rights divide, and wild animals on the other side." I'm not sure that her arguments would be of much help to farmed animals though, or perhaps would lead only to further welfare reforms. She would have it, I suspect, that we treat farmed animals "with dignity," but not necessarily that we stop exploiting them. Or at any rate, I think this is a reasonable conclusion to arrive at, given her reasoning. Though given her comment about wanting to see a more nuanced approach to rights theories as applied to nonhumans, who knows?

"However, there are undesirable behaviors, in dogs, for example, that have a strong instinctual motivation, but need to be prevented or re-channelled for the sake of the dog’s and caregiver’s wellbeing. E.g., jogger, car, and deer chasing, which can be common since dogs do have a prey chase drive. Such dangerous or undesirable behaviors may respond better to “punishment” such as electronic fences, shock collars. There is also obedience training with imitation of natural instinctual behavior to exert dominance. But this is not “forced” or “coerced.” Such is used because dogs respond to vocal and physical signals of dominance and submission."

It is still a matter of force and coercion, and would be such whether it was a human or another dog bringing about a change in the dog's behavior. The difference is, what dogs in a pack do to each other in order to establish dominance and submission is "natural" in a way that similar behaviors on the part of humans can only simulate. Anderson would argue that that's acceptable; I haven't said I agree, only that I find her concept of social contexts influencing "rights" interesting. And perhaps, on reflection, not even that. To counter your story of the man ordering his dog to lie down (which sounds like a thoughtful mimicry of what would happen if the dog were in a pack), I offer this: A relative of mine has neighbors, a husband and wife, who own a dog. The wife, who is mentally unstable, insists that the dog not bark or run over into my relative's yard to play with their dog (though my relative could care less). The neighbor's dog is now wearing a shock collar. The husband told my relative that the first time the dog was shocked, he yelped in pain and then hid under the bed for the rest of the day. The husband's not happy about use of the collar, but allows it in order to keep his wife happy. It could be argued that the dog is simply learning submission in a manner similar to that which it would learn as the member of a pack, but the motive is skewed by the wife's mental instability and the complete denial of the dog's natural behaviors (over and above what would occur were he the member of a pack). Anderson, so far as I can see, would find this acceptable; or at least, I don't know what her reasons would be for not finding it so. Perhaps that the dog was not being treated "with dignity."

"Similarly, “negative” does not necessarily mean something “bad” such as physical punishment causing unpleasant feedback like pain or fear. It just means something isn’t there that was, like a treat or toy."

"Negative" in the context of animal "conditioning" means the negation of something. That may mean the negation of a treat or toy, it may mean the negation of all natural behaviors, or it may mean anything in between.

"In sum, my dogs are involved in a reciprocal relationship with me, so I have responsibilities towards them and I instinctively grant them welfare “rights”, but they are not legal rights. To the rest of society, however, no reciprocal relationship exists. Unlike the reciprocal relationship that exists between humans, strangers and all."

Anderson would argue, I suspect, that to the degree that your dog or any dog cannot engage in a reciprocal relationship with humans, that dog's rights would be/should be curtailed. She's not demanding full rights for dogs or other domesticated animals under all social conditions. Quite the contrary: "Different rights emerge in different social contexts."

"I think Elizabeth Anderson’s argument seems to justify the same, when she suggests that the rights of a rat can be overridden when its behavior does not accommodate the interests of humans, unlike that of a dog that can take responsibility, as it were, for following human rules."

No, when Anderson speaks of rats, she is thinking of animals who "behave in ways hostile to human interests." Whatever one may make of that statement, it clearly is not the same matter as that of rats/other animals being killed during crop production. I don't know what her position would be on such animals though: she might well equate (or be forced to equate) "hostile" with "a lack of accomodation" to human interests.

"To have basic rights which can be so consistently overridden at what amounts to mere whim, such renders the notion meaningless."

The basic right AR generally seeks for nonhuman animals is the right not to be exploited. Animals killed during crop production have not been exploited. Again, I assume Anderson would also find their deaths acceptable, but in her case it would be because we have no "social relationship" with such animals, or have a relationship that is basically one of incompatibility, and hence would have to be defined as "negative."

"Rather, you don’t offer, for me, a philosophically and practically well-grounded argument for animal to have legal rights that protect them from human “exploitation.”

AR fundamentally asks that nonhuman animals be granted the right (protection) not to be exploited by humans. The right to such protection is grounded in various arguments by various writers. These would take a good deal of time to hash out, but I can't see that it would be useful to attempt to do so here. Your arguments all turn on the same essential idea: For any group under consideration to be eligible for rights - even the most basic right against exploitation - they must be able to reciprocate rights. The only group that can reciprocate rights are humans. Nonhuman animals cannot be granted rights because they are not human. You allow for no nuance on this formulation of rights, and in fact argue at great length against any straying from this rigid formulation. There's not much room for growth in conversation here, and not much point in debate.

Grizzly Bear said...

Hello Again. Thanks for your comments. I would like to address some of them.


"But you know the answer to this one, it's standard: sentience, autonomy, ability to suffer, etc."


Yes, it certainly is standard and it's vapid. We hear these criteria for rights parroted by ARAs ad nauseum. None of the things you just mentioned are valid criteria for determining what is and what is not a rights holder IMHO. For one, they are all completely arbitrary. Secondly, they are too vague almost to the point of not being definable in a logically working manner. Not all animals posses the same ability for sentience, autonomy or the capacity for suffering. A goldfish does not posses the same level of sentience as a chimpanzee. A cockroach does not posses the same capacity to suffer as a dog. The criteria you mention are impossible to define in an objective manner and have so so much variance between different types of animals, that they are rendered utterly useless as criteria for defining what is a rights holder.


"The basic right AR generally seeks for nonhuman animals is the right not to be exploited."


But no such right exists. All living things, even plants, exploit other living things at some level. Life feeds upon life, and all living things exploit other living things for their own benefit. That is the way of the cold, natural universe in which we live, and no matter how much you may wish it so, no amount of feel-good, Utopian philosophy is going to change it. When one grows up and and learns to accept and be comfortable with this truth, then notions like "animal rights" become quite silly. I would again ask the same question I posed to you before that you chose to dodge: if, for example, a rabbit does not have any right to not be eaten ( a form of "exploitation" ) by a hawk, a coyote, or a rattlesnake, then, by what purely logical grounds should that same rabbit have a right to not be eaten by a human?



"There's not much room for growth in conversation here, and not much point in debate."


Oh, but there certainly is. Just because someone disagrees with you and will not come around to your point of view, doesn't mean their is no point in the debate. The point of debate is for both sides to present their case and then for others to decide for themselves whose case has more validity. Forgive my saying so, but this seems kind of like a whiny, "I'm taking my toys and going home" kind of response.

Grizz

Anonymous said...

A few quick comments:


“I don't know offhand of any examples wherein nonhuman animals may exploit humans, and humans are left with no recourse but to accept the exploitation. You would need to provide such an example in order for me to consider the point.”

The Whitetail deer exploits human-made landscapes and has become an invigorated species because of it. Many kinds of wild animals exploit humans (rodents, insects, and birds thrive because of human behaviors). Dogs and cats have obviously exploited humans, and we them, hence their domestication. Some of the exploitation is mutual, some of it may be “good” or “bad” to the nonhuman/human animals individually or as a group.


“Ah, well, it is not I but Anderson who brings in the "social relationship" concept; and I did not bring Anderson into the conversation because I agree with her on all points, but because I thought she offered an interesting new perspective. Anderson starts with the idea that social contexts are important to understanding rights claims. And her conclusion is indeed that "Different rights emerge in different social contexts." She doesn't however consider relationships between mice and cats to be "social" because that term is meant to apply only to humans and their relationships (with other humans, or with nonhumans), at least when talking about rights issues. Rights, being formulated by humans, can't exist without a human being taking part in the rights relationship. “

I wonder then, how does Anderson define “the social relationship concept” or “social”? There are many different kinds of social relationships. The social relationship between farmer and farm animal, assumes a relationship in which the farmer maintains the animal in the expectation that it shall work and/or be slaughtered for food. The social relationship I have with my dog is one where he is a pet and I his pack leader and caregiver. The social relationship between my boss and I is one in which he exploits me for my skills and I exploit him for money in return for my skills. I’m not sure why Anderson would not consider animals to have social relationships with their conspecifics (e.g., members of a wolf pack) or with other nonhuman animal species (cats and dogs, e.g.).
Also, if the relationship between a cat and mouse is not “social”, then surely for many people the relationship between themselves and the farm animal they shall come to eat is not a “social” relationship either. Where do rights play into this, then? I can understand how Anderson might not see the relationship between a cat and mouse as not “social”, but not “because that term is meant to apply only to humans and their relationships with other humans and other nonhuman animals.”

“As to mice or cats "exploiting" humans, rights do not then become invalid. That is, Anderson would say that if mice were negatively impacting humans, we would have the right to exterminate them. Same with cats I suppose (feral ones).”

How do we have a “social relationship” with such mice that they have rights? Rights do become invalid if we can consistently exterminate certain mice and cats for mere convenience. How does Anderson define “negatively impacting humans”? Simply that they live in our houses when we don’t want them there because of the potential harm they could cause? Why would she not propose that mice have the right to be humanely trapped and re-located? Why not the right of feral cats to be spayed/neutered and released? For me, if we are just going to say that animals have rights, but then override them, then okay …

“Cats in the home (or mice kept as pets) would be taking part in a social relationship, and would have certain rights, as governed by the nature of that relationship.”

Then, what if “the nature of that relationship” where one of purpose-bred cats for research and testing, or where the animal is prey and the human is a hunter, or where the nature of that relationship is between farm animal and farmer, or meat eater?

“But you know the answer to this one, it's standard: sentience, autonomy, ability to suffer, etc.”
This standard has never been the basis for not exploiting. Life runs on exploitation, mutual and otherwise. Nor has this standard ever been a basis for granting basic legal rights, though certainly some rights do highlight that we have such capacities. If I have you kidnapped by quick sedation – so that you don’t suffer - and then physically abuse and kill you while you are “under”, is that okay just because you did not suffer? If we both were unemployed and had an interview for the same job and you were offered the job instead of me, I would certainly suffer. Do I have the right to that job, or any job?

Basically, you are justifying rights – though specifically the right not to be “exploited” - on the basis that animals have sentience, autonomy, and the ability to suffer, etc. This is standard “AR” criteria and has, imo, been too thoroughly discredited.


“I don't agree that we would have to change the nature of legal rights, only extend them to a group previously denied them. As has been done before. I realize that previous groups denied then granted rights have all been humans. But the point is that rights have proven flexible in the past;”

It had nothing to do with “rights flexibility.” It had to do with the fact that these groups of individuals were/are, indeed, humans to begin with, with the same capacity to reciprocate rights, make rights claims, and the like. There was no justification for discrimination and denying rights based on gender and skin colour, e.g. The basis for rights was still the same, that of reciprocity; that is, if you respected rights you kept them and if you did not live up to the social contract (right), you lost your rights or had them curtailed. Also, these human groups found no contradiction in “exploiting” animals while simultaneously advocating their own liberties.

If rights are so flexible, we could argue that plants should have rights since it was also once the case that nonhuman animals did not have rights. Slaves and women, e.g., deserved rights because they are human beings who reciprocate. Animals and plants do not.

Giving animals the same fundamental rights to life and liberty (I’m still not really sure what you mean by “the right not to be exploited”) we would change the nature of legal rights, as those same basic rights would not be reciprocated between all rights holders they way they are among humans and the way they would be among other species, if they could reciprocate rights.

“AR asks that that flexibility be again utilized to include nonhumans. The basis for the request being that inclusion in a specific species is not the key reason for granting rights.”

I agree that the basis for rights is not that one is of a specific species. The basis is reciprocity. It’s not the flexibility of rights. It certainly is not “social relationship”, unless you or Anderson have a particular meaning. Or rather, if it is going to be social relationship, then that needs to be explained because there could be a long social relationship between lab animal and animal researcher, e.g. We need to know why the nature of one social relationship is okay and the other not okay in re rights. Iow, why is it wrong to use in a certain way and kill animals.


“We grant them the basic right not to be exploited. We don't take away from them the basic right not to be exploited.”

Again, life runs on exploitation, sometimes mutual, at other times seemingly not mutual (but vital, as in the prey-predator relationship), and other times not at all beneficial individually or to the group. What do you mean by “exploited”? There is no such right even in human society. My workplace “exploits” me everyday. Babies and children are “exploited” for research, without their consent. I’m sure prisoners are “exploited” by fellow inmates, without their exploitation being prosectuted.


“I don't agree that granting nonhuman animals the basic legal right not to exploited would not answer the case. In other words, I see no reason why they should not be framed in the form of basic legal rights.”

Of course you wouldn’t! What does “the basic legal right not to exploited” mean? It would change the reciprocal/contractual nature of rights to something very one-sided and something rather meaningless, since we can override them for utilitarian consequence.


“However, Anderson is not precisely a pro-rights writer.”

That is very true. That’s really my point. For one who says animals X have rights, but then produces reasons where we can consistently override those rights of said animal rights holders ain’t a pro-rights/pro-animal rights writer/advocate.

“She is willing to admit, for instance, that while there exists a "powerful claim" to protect "animals against cruel treatment, even for compelling purposes," she also believes that when that purpose involves, for instance, medical experimentation that would benefit humans, "a far more nuanced moral theory" needs to be developed in order to ascertain whether it's humans or nonhumans who have the greater claim.”

Fundamental deontological rights do not come in degrees and cannot be overridden by utilitarian consequence.

I agree that there exists a “powerful claim to protect” (which is not a legal right) animals from cruel treatment. Animals are protected from cruelty towards them by humans. But, again, definitions may be important here, for what “AR” deems as cruel may not be the same as what others deem as cruel. How cruelty is understood legally is not the same as in nonlegal language.

“She does however state: "Third, a condition on having a right to be incorporated in human society is that life with humans is necessary to the animal. This places domesticated animals on the human side of the rights divide, “

Like the right to be used as farm animals and slaughtered for food? Since that is the way farm animals are incorporated in human society. There are many ways an animal can be “incorporated in human society.” Just being domesticated and having one’s welfare dependent upon humans does not itself mean one has the fundamental right not to be “exploited” in a certain way. Again, humans are exploited all the time. Anderson needs to argue what the proper nature of the social relationship between a domesticated animal and the human should be, and why. Should our relationship with cows be more like that of a “pet” relationship like we have with dogs – but, then some dogs in some cultures are eaten and used for fur, is this morally proper?

“ … I'm not sure that her arguments would be of much help to farmed animals though, or perhaps would lead only to further welfare reforms. She would have it, I suspect, that we treat farmed animals "with dignity," but not necessarily that we stop exploiting them. “

That’s what it looks like. This is not rights. This is welfarism, or something in between rights and welfare.

“Anderson would argue, I suspect, that to the degree that your dog or any dog cannot engage in a reciprocal relationship with humans, that dog's rights would be/should be curtailed. She's not demanding full rights for dogs or other domesticated animals under all social conditions. Quite the contrary: "Different rights emerge in different social contexts."”

They aren’t deontological legal rights that emerge from such a social context/relationship: I grant my dog whatever personal welfare “rights” (that aren’t legal rights; but some or most are probably legal welfare protections) I wish to give him on the basis of our personal reciprocal relationship. It is not a symmetrical relationship or a reciprocal relationship at a societal level like that between rights holding entities. Anderson does not use “rights” in a way that I think we would normally understand legal rights to be (regardless of the fact that only humans have rights for the moment). I agree that in virtue of the animal pet-human guardian/owner relationship, the animal has certain claims against humans for its physical and psychological needs. Call them rights to, in the sense of deserved and proper conduct to have welfare needs met, or whatever. But Anderson does not explain why these supposed “rights” that emerge in different social contexts should be legal rights. I mean, there are different social contexts among humans, but in many cases no legal rights emerge from those social relationships. There are conditions and “promises” that should be kept because of the contractual nature of these relationships, but basic legal rights do not emerge. If there are rights that emerge in domestic animal-human social relationships, then I could argue the same way as Anderson and suggest that I have rights claims against animals. But we would not expect to make rights claims against those animals because animals can’t understand and reciprocate at that level, but one could argue that such rights emerge from that social relationship.


“No, when Anderson speaks of rats, she is thinking of animals who "behave in ways hostile to human interests." Whatever one may make of that statement, it clearly is not the same matter as that of rats/other animals being killed during crop production. I don't know what her position would be on such animals though: she might well equate (or be forced to equate) "hostile" with "a lack of accomodation" to human interests. “

Sure it can be the same. Rats are killed – quite nastily - in granaries because “they behave in ways hostile to human interests” (eating and defecating/spreading disease, e.g.), or behaviour that does not accommodate the interests of humans. For me, I just don’t find it very inspiring if all we are just going to say is that animals have rights, and then we can override them.

“The basic right AR generally seeks for nonhuman animals is the right not to be exploited. Animals killed during crop production have not been exploited.”

Again, I’m not sure what you mean by “exploited.” For me, it is to use or kill for benefit; it can be mutual or not. E.g., humans killing rodents for the human benefit of growing, storing, and distributing uncontaminated vegan food for me to eat.

Anyway, it doesn’t matter. For you seem to be justifying rights on the basis that animals have sentience, autonomy, and the ability to suffer, etc. If one is going to say rats as pets have rights, then rats as whatever else should have rights. Rodents in a granary are just as sentient, autonomous, and feeling of pain as the pet rodent.

“Again, I assume Anderson would also find their deaths acceptable, but in her case it would be because we have no "social relationship" with such animals, or have a relationship that is basically one of incompatibility, and hence would have to be defined as "negative."”

It is also possible that I could have a relationship with a human that is basically one of incompatibility, and hence “negative”. Would their death be acceptable … One looses rights if one does not reciprocate rights, not because one deems one’s relationship with another as incompatible or negative.

“AR fundamentally asks that nonhuman animals be granted the right (protection) not to be exploited by humans. The right to such protection is grounded in various arguments by various writers. These would take a good deal of time to hash out, but I can't see that it would be useful to attempt to do so here. “

Advocates need to define this exploitation. Some do, e.g., animals have the right not to be hunted and killed by humans, or have the right not to be used in medical research. I realize that rights for animals not to be used in the ways given as examples have been grounded by arguments by different writers.

“Your arguments all turn on the same essential idea: For any group under consideration to be eligible for rights - even the most basic right against exploitation - they must be able to reciprocate rights. The only group that can reciprocate rights are humans. Nonhuman animals cannot be granted rights because they are not human. You allow for no nuance on this formulation of rights, and in fact argue at great length against any straying from this rigid formulation. …”

Wrong. I’ve never said that even humans have the right against exploitation (and I still don’t really know what you mean by “exploitation”). That makes the rest of what you say unfounded, imo.

“There's not much room for growth in conversation here, and not much point in debate.”

I would respectfully disagree, but as you wish. Thanks again for your responses. Regards, CarolWR

Anonymous said...

grizzly bear: "Yes, it certainly is standard and it's vapid. We hear these criteria for rights parroted by ARAs ad nauseum. None of the things you just mentioned are valid criteria for determining what is and what is not a rights holder IMHO. For one, they are all completely arbitrary. Secondly, they are too vague almost to the point of not being definable in a logically working manner. Not all animals posses the same ability for sentience, autonomy or the capacity for suffering. A goldfish does not posses the same level of sentience as a chimpanzee. A cockroach does not posses the same capacity to suffer as a dog. The criteria you mention are impossible to define in an objective manner and have so so much variance between different types of animals, that they are rendered utterly useless as criteria for defining what is a rights holder."

You do not mention what criteria you yourself would use to define who may be a rights holder - but it seems to me you mentioned reciprocity somewhere earlier on. I've already discussed why I disagree with this as a criteria. If the criteria AR offers seems "arbitrary" to you, I can only say that allowing humans rights/protections must then also be described as "arbitrary." What you call arbitrary however is a criteria which springs from the moral sensibilities of humans. That is, we do not exploit humans for the same fundamental reasons that we should not exploit nonhumans. As to the capacities I listed being vague, well, there are variances amongst humans and their capacities with regard "levels of sentience" (I assume you mean intelligence, particularly with regard to how that applies to self-awareness), autonomy, ability to suffer and etc. Yet we guarantee them the right to be free of exploitation based on a moral sensibility which holds that whatever level of capacity they have with regard to sentience, individual autonomy, ability to suffer etc, that capacity is great enough in any human to grant all humans such a right. AR asks why such a guarantee should not be granted nonhumans as well. I have yet to meet an argument that can justify their exclusion convincingly.

AR doesn't believe in granting rights based on the kind of hierarchical comparative analysis between species you offer. Rather, it seeks to grant all creatures rights based on certain baseline criteria shared by all (though those criteria vary somewhat depending on the theorist). When we are in doubt, Francione (I think) says that, just because we don't know whether an ant, say, has sentience, we aren't thereby given license to exploit those animals we know do possess it. In other words, lack of certainty with regard to where to draw the line amongst nonhumans doesn't give us the automatic right to exploit them all.

"But no such right exists. All living things, even plants, exploit other living things at some level. Life feeds upon life, and all living things exploit other living things for their own benefit. That is the way of the cold, natural universe in which we live, and no matter how much you may wish it so, no amount of feel-good, Utopian philosophy is going to change it. When one grows up and and learns to accept and be comfortable with this truth, then notions like "animal rights" become quite silly. I would again ask the same question I posed to you before that you chose to dodge: if, for example, a rabbit does not have any right to not be eaten ( a form of "exploitation" ) by a hawk, a coyote, or a rattlesnake, then, by what purely logical grounds should that same rabbit have a right to not be eaten by a human?"

On the grounds that nonhumans do not possess a moral sensibility, whereas humans do. It is of course "silly" as you say to compare wild animals eating each other to the practice of factory farming, experimenting on animals etc. That is, it's silly to argue that, because we are on the one hand amoral animals ourselves, we may exploit nonhuman animals as they exploit each other (and then some), while arguing on the other hand that because we are moral animals, we can draw moral conclusions with regard our behavior towards each other, each other's property, nonhuman animals, and nature itself. Unless of course you hold the point of view (and come to think of it, apparently you do) that morals are themselves arbitrary, and have manifested primarily, or are useful primarily, simply in order to provide a legal framework that allows us to live more or less in harmony with each other. Or perhaps you even believe that morals are something that themselves evolved out of a more or less arbitrary legal framework, and are therefore essentially meaningless, worth nothing more than a roll of the eyes? Regardless, you have yet to convincingly demonstrate why it is that such morals or legal frameworks, once posited, should not apply to nonhuman animals.

"Oh, but there certainly is. Just because someone disagrees with you and will not come around to your point of view, doesn't mean their is no point in the debate. The point of debate is for both sides to present their case and then for others to decide for themselves whose case has more validity. Forgive my saying so, but this seems kind of like a whiny, "I'm taking my toys and going home" kind of response."

Debates generally are limited in some fashion - by time, by number of responses allowed. Where no such limits exist (such as here), the limit must be self-imposed. The criteria I'll use in my defense for imposing a limitation upon my own contributions is one of having reached a certain conclusion with regard my opponent. With regards to Carol, that conclusion consists of an understanding, on my part, that her arguments limiting rights to humans are based on an arbitrarily exclusive criteria, and that the main motive for her arguments consists, as I said somewhere at the beginning of all this, of nothing more than a desire to justify the continued exploitation of nonhuman animals. That both she and you will disagree with this is more or less a given. As is the fact that I will, in all likelihood (given the arguments so far made), disagree with your disagreement. When a toy gets broken, or no longer amuses (or instructs) it is indeed time to pack it in.

Grizzly Bear said...

"You do not mention what criteria you yourself would use to define who may be a rights holder - but it seems to me you mentioned reciprocity somewhere earlier on."

Oh, but I did. It is reciprocity, social contractariansism, and the ability to take responsibility for one's actions. That's abundantly clear, anonymous, even from the title of the original post.



"What you call arbitrary however is a criteria which springs from the moral sensibilities of humans. That is, we do not exploit humans for the same fundamental reasons that we should not exploit nonhumans."

No. We do not "exploit" our fellow humans because allowing such exploitation to go on with impunity would eventually cause a breakdown in human societal structure. It has nothing to do with any kind of "higher moral authority" or "higher moral purpose" as I see it.


"AR asks why such a guarantee should not be granted nonhumans as well. I have yet to meet an argument that can justify their exclusion convincingly."


You are asking someone to prove a negative, which is a form of fallacious reasoning. No one actually has to prove or show why animals should not be granted rights. As the ones making the assertion ( that animals should have rights ) the burden of proof is squarely up the pro-AR side to make their case. And that proof should be made with facts, science, and reason, not with philosopho-babble, IMHO. I have yet to meet an argument that can justify their INCLUSION convincingly.


"It is of course "silly" as you say to compare wild animals eating each other to the practice of factory farming, experimenting on animals etc."


I did not compare predation to "factory farming" or experimentation. I am comparing predation of a wild animal by a wild animal to predation of a wild animal by a human. You're being coy, evasive, and putting words into my mouth. Since you have been evasive yet again, I will assume that you do not have a sufficient answer. The fact of the matter is, there is no real difference at all between predation of an animal by another animal and predation of that same animal by a human. The natural world makes no distinction as to whether that rabbit is killed by the hawk's talons, the snake's venom, or the hunter's arrow. The result is the same. Life feeding upon life, and the timeless cycle goes on.



"Unless of course you hold the point of view (and come to think of it, apparently you do) that morals are themselves arbitrary, and have manifested primarily, or are useful primarily, simply in order to provide a legal framework that allows us to live more or less in harmony with each other."


Yes! That is fairly accurate summary of my core view of morality. Morals, as well as laws, are human constructions that exist so as to maintain order in human society, which is necessary for the survival of our species. It is really nothing more. Morals do not exist outside the human sphere in the cold, natural, amoral universe. For one to suggest that the source of morality is some "higher power" or that morality exists simply for its own sake, or that it is some kind of timeless, inflexible code that is never to be challenged, is not particularly rational, IMHO.


"Regardless, you have yet to convincingly demonstrate why it is that such morals or legal frameworks, once posited, should not apply to nonhuman animals."


Again, fallacious "prove a negative", "shifting the burden of proof" type of reasoning. Asking someone to demonstrate that such moral or legal frameworks should NOT apply to nonhuman animals is like asking a defendant to demonstrate or prove that he is NOT guilty. As the ones making a claim and calling for change, the burden of proof is squarely upon those who advocate for animal rights. And all attempts by said advocates to do so that I have seen, fail miserably.


"With regards to Carol, that conclusion consists of an understanding, on my part, that her arguments limiting rights to humans are based on an arbitrarily exclusive criteria, and that the main motive for her arguments consists, as I said somewhere at the beginning of all this, of nothing more than a desire to justify the continued exploitation of nonhuman animals."


You are committing once again the same "circumstantial ad hominem" fallacy that I pointed out to you before.

Anonymous said...

With regards to Carol, that conclusion consists of an understanding, on my part, that her arguments limiting rights to humans are based on an arbitrarily exclusive criteria, and that the main motive for her arguments consists, as I said somewhere at the beginning of all this, of nothing more than a desire to justify the continued exploitation of nonhuman animals.


I think behaviorally I’m actually as animal rights as any “AR” advocate!

Anonymous said...

"Asking someone to demonstrate that such moral or legal frameworks should NOT apply to nonhuman animals is like asking a defendant to demonstrate or prove that he is NOT guilty. As the ones making a claim and calling for change, the burden of proof is squarely upon those who advocate for animal rights."

No. What I've been saying is that rights for animals, on both moral and legal grounds, already exist in nascent form, and need only be applied. Just as rights for women and slaves always existed in nascent form, but were not always applied. It is, therefore, up to those who oppose animal rights to come up with a convincing argument as to why rights should not apply to nonhumans. Neither you nor Carol has yet done so, imo.

"You are committing once again the same "circumstantial ad hominem" fallacy that I pointed out to you before."

No. I am not saying that Carol's arguments against animal rights are false because of the motive described. I am saying that her arguments are not valid, period - then describing what I believe her motive is for making those arguments. In other words, I'm describing what I feel is revealed about her psychologically via her arguments and comments, her stated claims vs. what is demonstrated via her approach to the issue at hand, and so forth.

Anonymous said...

Last day for me. Sorry to have missed whatever response from Carol might have been forthcoming. Thanks for the conversation. . . .

Anonymous said...

“What I've been saying is that rights for animals, on both moral and legal grounds, already exist in nascent form, and need only be applied. Just as rights for women and slaves always existed in nascent form, but were not always applied.”

When you say rights exist in nascent form, do you mean rights are natural/nature-given/inherent? If so, how do humans and animals have such nascent/natural/inherent rights? I’m not sure how one argues that one is born with rights, if that is what you mean. Moral and legal rights seem to be something that humans made up for the purposes of governing relationships amongst humans (and whoever can be expected to show the same respect) so that we can live in relative peace and order in society. There are rights that reflect human nature (or the nature of the rights-holder), but they come with societal expectations to be able to behave in such a way that respects the same rights in others. Rights are principles which indicate the necessary and agreed upon, and reciprocated, restraints on behavior in society so that rights-holding individuals can flourish, thus pursue their own existence amidst a world of other rights-holding beings, each owing the same measure of respect to others that they owe to them. If you believe this is incorrect, please argue against it. Some rights theorists do say humans have inherent rights, discoverable, and once discerned we enshrine them into law and enforce them, e.g. But, they are rights that we perceive humans ought morally to have and we still agree upon and entered into and they still function as social contracts.

Rights for women and blacks never existed in nascent form. If by “nascent” you mean nature-given and inherent in these people. Human rights came about because humans decided to devise them for humans for reasons given above, unless you can argue differently. Women and blacks were denied them, unfairly. Women and blacks ought to have been granted rights, but not because they “naturally” had rights. But, because women and blacks are as fully human as men and whites are, and who are able to claim rights and reciprocate rights just as men and whites can.

“It is, therefore, up to those who oppose animal rights to come up with a convincing argument as to why rights should not apply to nonhumans. Neither you nor Carol has yet done so, imo.”

We have shown the function and nature of rights and how rights depend upon reciprocity and thus cannot apply to nonhuman animals. You have yet to show that rights are not contractual in nature (by showing, e.g., that if one doesn’t reciprocate rights one doesn’t lose all or some of ones own rights), nor have you given justification that rights need not be reciprocated by animals (just because animals can’t reciprocate legal rights is not justification enough. Nor are animal sentience, autonomy, and suffering – which entitles animals to our moral consideration of them and legal protections, but not basic legal rights because rights depend on reciprocity, unless you can argue otherwise). Also, show how rights are “nascent”, for I’m not sure what you mean by that. CarolWR

Anonymous said...

“What I've been saying is that rights for animals, on both moral and legal grounds, already exist in nascent form, and need only be applied. Just as rights for women and slaves always existed in nascent form, but were not always applied.”

Perhaps you mean that these rights exist out of the relationship we have with them. You still have not shown how this can be. You merely stated it per Anderson. The personal relationship that is between pet dog and owner/caregiver, e.g. What arises from this relationship are duties and responsibilities to take care of the dog in its role as a pet. Such duties of humane care arise in the farmer who has a “food” animal, that is, an animal who will be “exploited” as food. Yet, you say animals should not be exploited based on their sentience, autonomy, and their capacity to suffer. Yet, you grant such sentience, etc., and the right not to be exploited (which you still have not defined or explained) to a pet rat, but dismiss the value of sentience and autonomy in a rat in a granary. CarolWR